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Religious Beliefs about Suffering:  Measure Validation and Relationships with Well-Being  
 
Amy Elisabeth Hale, Ph.D.  
University of Connecticut, 2014  
  
Beliefs form a core dimension of all world religions, but there is limited data on the 
relationships between specific religious beliefs and well-being. This dissertation presents 
findings from two studies of beliefs about suffering using the Views of Suffering Scale (VOSS; 
Hale-Smith, Park, & Edmondson, 2012).  Study 1 was a cross-sectional validation study using an 
online sample of 1000 participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.  Participants self-
identified as Catholic, Protestant, Atheist/Agnostic, Hindu, Muslim, or Jewish.  Measures 
included information regarding demographics and measures of religious history and beliefs.   
Findings from Study 1 indicated differences in beliefs based on age, geographic region, 
religious affiliation, and how religious or spiritual participants were. The data replicated previous 
findings, indicating that the VOSS is a valid measure of beliefs across religious contexts in the 
United States. Additionally, the data suggested that although broad religious groupings into the 
major world religions may have some utility, assumptions about a person’s beliefs based on their 
denomination may be erroneous.  
Study 2 was a longitudinal study of beliefs, physical and mental well-being. Participants 
were 300 senior citizens who completed two surveys three months apart.  Measures included 
demographics, religious beliefs about suffering, physical and mental health, attitudes toward God, 
stressful life events, the most stressful event experienced between Time 1 and Time 2, coping 
strategies, and perceptions of stress-related growth.  This study explored relationships between  
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beliefs and well-being cross-sectionally and longitudinally using a mixture of correlations, 
regression, and structural equation modeling.   
Results indicated that many beliefs are related to well-being, sometimes directly and 
other times mediated by optimism and negative attitudes towards God.  Most significant 
relationships predicted poorer well-being on psychological rather than physical measures of 
health, with a few exceptions. Beliefs were also related to coping strategies and perceptions of 
growth in several ways.  These studies represent some of the first psychological research 
conducted on religious beliefs about suffering and indicate that this is a rich area for further 
study. 
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Introduction 
Humans have struggled to understand to suffering in many ways over the centuries. 
Defined here as a person’s subjective experience of distress in response to a stressor, suffering is 
a universal human experience (Kahn & Steeves, 1986). It can be acute or chronic and can vary in 
intensity. For some, suffering comes in the experience of loss and subsequent grief.  Others 
suffer because of individual cruelty or natural disasters, because of chronic pain, mental illness, 
or experiences of prejudice.  Suffering affects children when they are bullied, workers when they 
are injured, and elderly people when they lose their ability to function independently. Stressors 
vary, but the experience of suffering is universal. 
Philosophers, writers, historians, scientists, and other scholars have grappled with how to 
understand, respond to, and avoid suffering (Chapman & Gavrin, 1993).  Psychologists joined in 
this quest from the very beginning, and today a great deal of psychological research is connected 
in some way to the quest to alleviate or prevent suffering.  The questions are wide-ranging, 
incorporating both individuals (e.g., Why do some people become depressed?) and entire groups 
(e.g., How can we reduce the impact of stigma?).  Every branch of psychology focuses on 
suffering in some way, whether through understanding how it is caused (e.g., the neurochemistry 
of schizophrenia), trying to change a behavior that causes suffering (e.g. bullying in elementary 
schools), or reducing the probability of suffering (e.g., improving workplace environments).    
In keeping with this tradition, this project explores human experiences of suffering from 
the perspectives of cognitive theory and the psychology of religion, aiming to better understand 
how people view suffering and how this understanding is related to individuals’ appraisals of 
stressors and coping strategies, life experiences, and well-being.  In these studies, we focus on 
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what people think about suffering, how those thoughts may be associated with religious beliefs, 
and how those cognitions may relate to well-being.   
The Importance of Cognitions 
Since the 1960’s, psychologists have been studying how people’s thoughts impact their 
behaviors and well-being.  According to the transactional model of stress and coping (Folkman 
& Lazarus, 1980), people’s attempts to deal with stress (i.e., coping) are based on their 
perceptions of both an event/potential stressor and of their resources.  When people experience 
an event, their primary appraisal results from evaluating the event’s significance and valence as 
threat, loss, or challenge.  Their secondary appraisal involves evaluating their potential internal 
and external coping resources; based on this information, people then choose a coping strategy.  
In this model, the specific ways in which people appraise stressors and the resources 
available to them are critical components of how overwhelmed they feel in response to their 
stressful event. For example, if someone interprets an event as challenging rather than harmful, 
then that person will feel less stressed. If an employee perceives feedback from her supervisor as 
an important tool for professional growth rather than as a sign of personal failure, she will be less 
distressed at receiving negative feedback.  Similarly, if a therapist perceives conflict with a client 
as an opportunity to model healthy conflict-resolution skills, he is likely to experience much less 
distress at the therapeutic rupture than he might if he saw it as threatening to his competence.  
In terms of coping strategies, awareness of potential resources is essential (e.g. coping 
abilities, social support, previous experience) because if someone does not think that he or she 
has a resource available then he or she will not attempt to use it.  For example, if a woman is 
experiencing violence in a relationship, she could assess the situation as extremely stressful, but 
without knowledge of local non-profit organizational resources, she may not pursue legal 
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recourse.  Similarly, if an international student is struggling to write papers in a foreign language 
and does not know that the university provides proof-reading for international students, then he 
will not attempt to use those services even though they could be an excellent coping strategy.   
According to the transactional stress-coping model, perceptions of a stressor and potential 
resources are both critical ingredients in determining an individual’s overall stress response 
(Aldwin, 2007). If someone perceives an event as potentially challenging but determines that he 
or she has adequate resources available to cope, his or her distress level could be quite low.  By 
the same token, someone can appraise a relatively innocuous situation as stressful, be convinced 
that he or she does not have the resources necessary to address it, and feel overwhelmed. The 
person’s thoughts are a major component in predicting how he or she will respond to any given 
situation.  They explain why some individuals are stressed by relatively small problems while 
others manage extraordinarily large ones with grace and relative ease.   
Importantly, a thought’s accuracy does not determine its level of influence.  Cognitive 
therapy, Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, and other 
treatment modalities all incorporate the assumption that what people think about things and the 
language that they use will influence how they experience them (Dattilio & Freeman, 1992; 
Hayes & Strosahl, 2004).  The reality is that people have the thoughts, and those thoughts 
influence their well-being. 
Where Do Thoughts Come From?   
As we consider how individuals’ thoughts influence their well-being in response to 
stressors, one obvious question regards where those thoughts come from. How do people decide 
what meaning to attach to circumstances (i.e., how to interpret stressors), and which of their 
coping strategies is available and most likely to be useful?  These are complex questions, and to 
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find some answers we must turn to the constructs of worldview and schema.   
Worldviews are “a set of assumptions about physical and social reality that may have 
powerful effects on cognition and behavior,” shaping people’s interpretations of and interactions 
with the world around them (Koltko-Rivera, 2004, p. 3).  People’s worldviews inform their 
beliefs about existential issues, their evaluations of things as morally good or bad, and whether 
they identify things as positive or negative (Koltko-Rivera, 2004; Rokeach, 1973). Worldviews 
provide the framework to organize beliefs about our identities and the world around us (Schlitz, 
Vieten, & Miller, 2010). 
Although sometimes equated with worldviews (e.g., (Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Liu, 2002), 
schemas are typically defined as being more specific and circumscribed,  “a cognitive structure 
or mental representation containing organized, prior knowledge about a particular domain, 
including a specification of the relations among its attributes (McIntosh, 1995, p. 2).  The 
individual depends on his or her schema or worldview to form perceptions and assessments of 
each situation, and it is these perceptions that influence how people cope with stressors, thereby 
influencing their experiences of suffering.  
Cognitions, then, are a product of worldviews and schemas, but where do those come 
from?  There are many contributors to worldviews and schemas including genetic tendencies, 
religion, culture, geographic region, and individual experiences (Schlitz et al., 2010) but one 
view of the sources of worldviews and schemas that holds the most promise for psychological 
researchers is religion. Sometimes described as a cognitive schema itself (e.g., McIntosh, 1995) 
and other times more generally as a contributor to worldviews (e.g., Carone, 2001), religion is 
integral in helping a person interpret and evaluate information and experiences.    
Religion is powerful both because one of its main functions is to provide people with a 
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sense of meaning (e.g., Berger, 1967; also see Park, Edmondson, & Hale-Smith, 2013 for a more 
thorough discussion) and because it is more generally an important part an individual’s culture 
(Baumeister, 1991). Worldwide, the percentage of people in each country who report that 
religion is important to them varies, but the numbers are staggering:  only three countries polled 
worldwide had less than 20% of people who identified religion as important, while 32 countries 
had 95% or more (Crabtree, 2010).  Within the United States, 65% of Americans report that 
religion is “moderately” to “very” important to them (Crabtree, 2010).   
Religion comprises many different dimensions and there is no clear agreement on what 
the central dimensions of religion are.  However, religious beliefs (i.e., what people think 
because of or in relation to their religions) are one of the few dimensions that virtually every 
scholar agrees is part of the larger religion construct ( Hall, Meador, & Koenig, 2008; Idler, 
Musick, Ellison, & George, 2003). Religious beliefs may be thoughts about religion itself (e.g., 
“There is a personal God”), or can be cognitions that a person has that are shaped by religion.  
For example, beliefs might be expressed as moral judgments (e.g., “It is wrong to kill”), values 
(e.g., “The most important thing in life is being a loving person”), attributions (e.g., “There is a 
drought because a higher power is withholding rain”), interpretations of events (e.g., “I got a 
promotion at work so God must be happy with me”), or any other thought influenced by religion.   
Although religious beliefs are often conceptualized as accessible, easily-articulated 
cognitions, in reality they may operate consciously or unconsciously.  In their seminal work on 
the science of religious beliefs, Barrett and Lanman (2008) note that beliefs may be either 
reflective (i.e., conscious and easily articulated) or non-reflective (beliefs that influence 
information processing, speech and action but of which we are not necessarily aware).  Beliefs 
may be adopted after a deliberate thought process or may be shaped as a result of enculturation 
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(Barrett & Lanman, 2008).  Given psychology’s interest in cognitions and schemas, and the way 
that religion functions to provide meaning within worldviews and schemas, it seems natural that 
psychologists would be interested in research on religious beliefs (e.g., Carone, 2001; Newton & 
Mcintosh, 2010).   
Religion’s influence on psychological process also extends beyond cognitions to issues of 
coping and meaning. Scholars note that religious beliefs may impact psychopathology (e.g., 
Patrick & Kinney, 2003) and factors related to individuals’ well-being (e.g., coping,Pargament et 
al., 1990)).  Studies show that religion is especially important to individuals who are in stressful 
situations and those requiring clinical interventions (e.g., Graham, Furr, Flowers, & Burke, 2001; 
Koenig, George, & Peterson, 1998; Tix & Frazier, 1998). Religion provides meaning for 
individuals and entire communities (Berger, 1967) and may serve as a source of comfort 
(Musick, 2000).   
Religious Responses to Suffering   
Suffering as a general topic is addressed by all religions but with tremendous variation. 
Sometimes suffering is seen as a sign that an individual or entire people group is being punished 
by a higher power (e.g., Brown, 2005), other times as a natural (if unfortunate) part of the world, 
but not a reflection of divine concern or power (e.g., Lewis, 1944; Whitney, 1985).  Others see 
suffering as karma, the just results of one’s past actions in the present (e.g., Whitman, 2007).  
Sometimes suffering is viewed as an invitation to become more like a God who suffered out of 
love for the world (e.g., Moltmann, 1993).  For others, suffering is something to be mindful of as 
it happens (e.g., Hanh & Hanh, 1998), but not necessarily to be changed.  For yet another group 
of people, their a-religious beliefs inform them that suffering is a random occurrence that has 
nothing to do with the divine (Dawkins, 1995).  Within Christianity, there is an entire field of 
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theological study known as “theodicies,” attempts to explain the presence of suffering while 
maintaining orthodox doctrines on the goodness and power of God (Brown, 1999).  
Not only do religions provide reasons why suffering takes place, but they also provide 
answers regarding what people should do about it.  According to various religious perspectives, 
when faced with difficult situations, people should sacrifice animals, fast, pray, search their lives 
for the cause, attempt to do good in order to avoid more suffering, or simply notice the 
experience of suffering rather than attempt to control or avoid it.  Many books have been written, 
lectures given, and sermons preached on how the devout should manage experiences of pain.   
Given the importance of cognitions in how humans respond to stress, the centrality of 
religious beliefs for much of the world’s population, and fact that religions address human 
suffering at length, it is no surprise that several researchers over the last twenty years have called 
for research on religious beliefs about suffering (Furnham & Brown, 1992; Hall & Johnson, 
2001).  In spite of these calls for research, only a few studies have been conducted (e.g., Gray & 
Wegner, 2010; Musick, 2000; Watson, 1987).   
This lack of research on beliefs about suffering, while somewhat perplexing, is not a 
complete surprise.  The psychology of religion is generally less-researched by psychologists than 
might be expected considering its presence in every culture and importance worldwide. To make 
a comparison of another subject, consider research on depression.  The World Health 
Organization identified depression as the most significant cause of lost years due to a disability 
(Bromet et al., 2011).  One might expect psychologists to attend more to depression than religion 
because of its obvious impact on quality of life and productivity, but even after considering this, 
the imbalance in research production is remarkable.  In contrast to religion where the minimum 
percentage of people who said it was important to them was 16% (in Estonia; Crabtree, 2010), 
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the number of people who claimed to experience depression reached a maximum of 21% (France; 
Bromet et al., 2011); there are several countries worldwide where more than 90% of the 
population reported that religion was important to them (Crabtree, 2010).  In spite of this, there 
are more than seven times the number of articles published on depression than there are on 
religion (77,209 vs. 10,592) in PsycInfo alone.  
This example is provided not to suggest that there should be less research on depression, 
but to illustrate the reality that religion has received less attention from the psychological 
research community than would be expected from such an important aspect of the world’s 
population.  There are several factors that may have held researchers back up until now including 
a lack of knowledge regarding religion’s importance, general prejudice against religion itself, 
and methodological barriers to studying beliefs (Park & Paloutzian, 2013).   
Why the Lack of Research on Beliefs about Suffering?  
In terms of lack of knowledge, the lack of research on religious cognitions about 
suffering may be that psychologists are simply ignorant of the value that the general population 
places on religion or the rich tradition of scholarship in this area by religious studies scholars and 
theologians.  Certainly, psychologists in the United States tend to be much less religious than 
other members of the population (Bergin & Jensen, 1990; Shafranske & Malony, 1990), and 
because research topics are often chosen by personal interest, it makes sense that there would be 
less research on religion than other topics.  Additionally, the incorrect use of religious terms (e.g. 
theodicy; Daugherty, West, Williams, & Brockman, 2009) suggests that psychology researchers 
are not always as well-versed in religious scholarship today in the same way that they are 
acquainted with the medical literature after decades of collaborating with biologists and 
physicians. 
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Another possible reason for the lack of research on religious beliefs about suffering is a 
broader prejudice of psychologists against religion.  Early psychologists were more concerned 
with dismissing religion than evaluating it as a potential area of study (e.g., Ellis, 1980; Freud, 
1928/1964), and only in the last 30 years have scholars engaged in extensive research on 
religion’s impact on individual (Ai, Hall, Pargament, & Tice, 2012; Hackney & Sanders, 2003; 
Plante & Sherman 2001), social (e.g., Graham & Haidt, 2010; Heaton, 2013), neuro- (e.g., 
Kapogiannis et al., 2009; Schjoedt, Stodkilde-Jorgensen, Geertz, & Roepstorff, 2009), and 
developmental psychology (Bering, 2006; Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, & Banaji, 2012).  To date, 
the majority of research has been conducted in North America, but increasing numbers of studies 
are being published involving participants from other racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural 
backgrounds (e.g., Al-Azri, Al-Awisi, & Al-Rasbi, 2013; Gigi, Papirovitz, & Hagit, 2007; 
Loewenthal, Cinnirella, Evdoka, & Murphy, 2001; Obligacion, 1999).  Based on the dramatic 
increase in research on religious topics (particularly religion and health) in the last decade, it 
appears that researchers are now less limited by the prejudice that characterized early 
psychology, but a tremendous amount of work remains to be done to make up for the field’s 
early silence on this topic.  
A third reason for the lack of research on religious beliefs about suffering may have been 
a lack of measurement tools. Until recently, there were no measures to assess religious beliefs 
about suffering:  only with the introduction of the Views of Suffering Scale (VOSS; Hale-Smith 
et al., 2012) was a psychometrically-sound, validated measure of individuals’ beliefs about 
suffering available.  Importantly, unlike previous attempts to measure views of suffering (e.g. 
Musick, 2000), the VOSS moves beyond Christian theodicies and incorporates viewpoints 
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relevant to people from a variety of religious and non-religious traditions (i.e., Christians, 
Muslims, Hindus, Jews, Buddhists, Atheists/Agnostics).   
Designed for a North American population but flexible enough to be adapted for other 
contexts, the VOSS incorporates some of the most common North American religious and 
spiritual beliefs about suffering, including beliefs about God’s role and presence, randomness, 
retribution (i.e., karma), and unorthodox theistic beliefs (Table 1). Religious perspectives were 
included based on the most common religious orientations in the United States (Pew Forum, 
2008). The VOSS’ psychometrics were examined in a sample of more than 600 undergraduate 
students and the results suggested that it has strong reliability (i.e., internal consistency and test-
retest reliability had good α’s and r’s > .70) and validity (e.g., comparisons to measures of 
related constructs suggest that the VOSS scores demonstrate good convergent validity).   
Overview of the Present Studies 
This dissertation comprises two studies, designed to address both the need for 
psychometrically-sound measures of religious beliefs about suffering and to explore relationships 
between cognitions about suffering and well-being.  The first was a validation study of the 
VOSS, examining the scale’s properties in a non-college-student sample.  For this study, a large, 
religiously diverse online sample was recruited to examine the VOSS’ factor structure, validity, 
and potential usefulness with multiple religious groups. Importantly, this study allowed us to 
examine differences in these beliefs across religious groups.  
The second study examined how beliefs about suffering might be related to well-being in 
a sample of senior citizens using a longitudinal design.  Variables of interest include basic 
demographics, religious beliefs, physical and mental health, and life stressors.   This longitudinal 
study provides much-needed data about beliefs about suffering as potential predictors of well-
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being and the stability of beliefs. Together, these studies represent a significant step forward in 
research on religious beliefs about suffering and open up a whole new line of research for future 
scholars who wish to continue exploring suffering and related constructs including images of 
God, individuals’ perceptions of locus of control, and attributions regarding suffering. 
Study 1 Method 
Participants and Procedures 
Study 1 explored the VOSS’ psychometrics in a diverse sample using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is a crowdsourcing marketplace that allows “requesters” to 
post tasks to be fulfilled by online users (“workers”) (Ipeirotis, 2010; Paolacci, Chandler, & 
Ipeirotis, 2010).  A total of 1000 participants were recruited with quotas for specific groups:  500 
Christians (250 Catholics, and 250 Protestants), and 100 each of Muslims, Atheists/Agnostics, 
Jewish, Hindu and Buddhist.  The number of Christians recruited for this study was larger than 
that of other religious traditions in keeping with the religious distribution within the United 
States (Pew, 2008).  To participate in this study, workers had to reside in the United States and 
self-identify as one of the targeted recruitment groups.   
Participants selected the survey based on the MTurk task description.  The study 
description visible to all MTurk workers stated: “Answer a 30 minute research survey about your 
religious beliefs & views. People who consider themselves Muslim/Islamic [or Protestant, 
Catholic, Hindu, etc.] in their beliefs are welcome to participate in this survey.”  In keeping with 
MTurk best practices, the survey included five attention check questions to confirm that all 
participants were engaged in the survey (Amazon Mechanical Turk, 2011).  Both the study 
description and the information sheet informed participants that the survey included five 
attention-check questions and only data from workers who answered all of these questions 
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correctly would be paid and included in the research study.  The questions included items such as 
“I consider myself Catholic” (for Catholic participants) and “Have you ever had a fatal heart 
attack while watching TV?” (yes/no response). If an individual did not answer all of the 
attention-check questions correctly their data was not used. 
Measures 
Demographic questionnaire. Demographics included age, gender, race, income, level of 
education, and state of residence.  Participants were also asked about their self-ranking regarding 
their level of religiousness or spirituality, belief in God, and religious history (i.e., whether or not 
they had had religious or spiritual experiences that changed their lives, whether they had had a 
significant gain or loss of religious faith).  Religious demographic items were from the Brief 
Multidimensional Measure of Religion and Spirituality (BMMRS; Fetzer & NIA, 1999) except 
for the question related to belief in God (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975).   
Christian Orthodoxy Scale (Short Form). The Christian Orthodoxy Scale (Short Form) 
was used to test the VOSS’ validity.  This abbreviated form of the 24-item Christian Orthodoxy 
Scale (Hunsberger, 1989) is a 5-item questionnaire related to orthodox Christian tenets (Hill & 
Hood, 1999; Hunsberger, 1989). Responses on the seven-point Likert scale range from 0 
(“strongly disagree”) to 6 (“strongly agree”), including a neutral option.  Examples of items 
include, “Jesus was the divine Son of God” and “Despite what people believe, there is no such 
thing as a God who is aware of our actions” (reverse scored).  Higher scores on the scale reflect a 
more orthodox religious orientation.  Previous studies indicate that the Christian Orthodoxy 
Scale has excellent psychometrics with a mean inter-item correlation of .72, a Cronbach’s alpha 
of .94, and individual item correlations of  >.76 (Hunsberger, 1989).  In this sample the 
Chronbach’s alpha was .92. 
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The Christian Orthodoxy Scale was included to assess validity of the Unorthodox scale.  
It was hypothesized that Christian orthodoxy scores would be negatively correlated to 
Unorthodox scores.  It was also expected that orthodoxy scores would be highly correlated with 
Overcoming and Providence scores, as two of the perspectives that assume an orthodox view of 
God. 
World Assumptions Scale.  The World Assumptions Scale (WAS) was included to 
examine the validity of several VOSS subscales.  The WAS is a 32-item questionnaire with eight 
subscales (Janoff-Bulman, 1989), four of which we planned to use in analyses.  The scale’s 
questions center on assumptions about the benevolence of the world (e.g., “There is more good 
than evil in the world”), benevolence of people (e.g., “Human nature is basically good”), justice 
(e.g. “Misfortune is least likely to strike worthy, decent people”), controllability (e.g., “People’s 
misfortunes result from mistakes they have made”), randomness (e.g., “The course of our lives is 
largely determined by chance”), self-worth (e.g., “I often think I am no good at all”), self-
controllability (e.g., “I usually behave in ways that are likely to maximize good results for me”), 
and luck (e.g., “I am basically a lucky person”).  The WAS responses are based on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 4 (“strongly agree”).  All scales were shown 
to have reliability between .67 and .78 (Kaler et al., 2008). In this sample all scales had alphas of 
.74 to .86. 
We expected that high WAS Randomness subscale scores would positively correlate with 
VOSS Random scores, and WAS Justice scores would similarly correlate to VOSS Retribution 
scores since both concepts assume that people get what they deserve in life.   WAS Luck scores 
were expected to correlate negatively with high VOSS Providence scores since the latter 
assumes that there is a God orchestrating events rather than assuming that events are a matter of 
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chance.  Lastly, scores on the WAS Self-Control scales were expected to correlate positively 
with VOSS Retribution scores because, in theory, the belief that one’s actions directly influences 
the future should positively relate to beliefs about the world’s controllability.   
God Image Scales. The God Image Scales (Lawrence, 1991, 1997) were also included to 
examine the validity of several VOSS subscales. This study utilized the Benevolence, 
Providence, and Challenge subscales of the God Image Scales (GIS) (Lawrence, 1997).  The GIS 
assesses individuals’ perceptions of God using 12 items per subscale. Benevolence accesses 
beliefs related to divine goodness, Providence measures beliefs in divine control, and Challenge 
examines beliefs that God’s goal is to help people to grow.  Examples of items include “I think 
of God as more compassionate than demanding” (Benevolence), “I think God mostly leaves 
people free” (Providence), and “God wants me to achieve all I can in life” (Challenge).   All GIS 
subscale responses are based on a 4-point Likert format with choices from 0 (“strongly 
disagree”) to 3 (“strongly agree”). Internal reliability coefficients for all scales range from .86 to 
.94 (Lawrence, 1991).  In this sample alphas ranged from .82-.86. 
It was expected that scores on the GIS Benevolence scale would be negatively correlated 
with VOSS Unorthodox scores and positively related to VOSS Suffering God, since belief in 
God’s benevolence is a core orthodox tenet and belief in a God who suffers with people 
presupposes a God who is compassionate towards people.   Similarly, it was expected that the 
GIS Challenge and VOSS Soul-Building subscales would be positively correlated since the latter 
frames suffering as a challenge from God.  Similarly, scores on the GIS Providence and VOSS 
Providence scales were expected to correlate highly since they both relate to the level of divine 
control over individual suffering.  GIS Providence was expected to correlate negatively with 
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VOSS Random scores since a high endorsement of belief in providence presumes that events 
occur as a direct result of divine intervention.  
Paulhus Deception Scales. The Paulhus Deception Scales (PDS), also known as the 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR), includes two subscales (Paulhus, 1998).  
This study included the 20-item Image Management (IM) scale, which identifies conscious 
attempts at self-enhancement.  The PDS uses a 5-point Likert format with choices ranging from 1 
(“not true”) to 5 (“very true”).  Examples of items include, “I never cover up my mistakes” and 
“I have done things that I don't tell other people about” (reverse scored).  Individuals who score 
extremely high or extremely low on this scale could be “faking good” or “faking bad” and the 
validity of their responses should be questioned (Paulhus, 1998).  Previous research 
demonstrated an internal reliability coefficient alpha of .70-.75, and the IM scale’s reliability as 
.81-.86.  The PDS was included to explore the possible influence of social desirability both in 
individual scores and within specific religious groups. Cronbach’s alpha for the IM scale in this 
sample was .84.  
Analytic Plan 
In this study we sought to both examine—in a community sample – previously identified 
relationships between VOSS subscales and established measures, and to explore new areas that 
might inform our understanding of the VOSS’ validity as a measurement tool.  We examined 
correlations with other established measures and looked at the VOSS’ relationship with specific 
demographic variables.  We also examined VOSS scores in relation to social desirability.      
We had several hypotheses related to how the VOSS’ subscales would relate to one 
another and to several established measures of related constructs.  Specifically, we hypothesized 
that the VOSS subscales based on the most traditional Christian and monotheistic beliefs (e.g., 
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Divine Responsibility, Providence, Soul-Building, Suffering God, Overcoming, Encounter, 
Limited Knowledge) would all be positively correlated.  We hypothesized that they would have 
negative correlations to Unorthodox beliefs. We hypothesized that Providence in particular 
would be strongly negatively correlated to Random beliefs, since they are antithetical to one 
another (i.e., the former states that suffering happens within divine planning, the latter without 
any overarching plan).   
Regarding relationships with other measures, we hypothesized that the Christian 
Orthodoxy scale would be positively correlated to the Divine Responsibility, Providence, Soul-
Building, Suffering God, Overcoming, Encounter, and Limited Knowledge subscales.  Each of 
these views is present in traditional Christian teachings, and people high in Christian Orthodoxy 
would be expected to endorse traditional Christian views. For this same reason, we expected that 
Unorthodox scores would be negatively correlated to responses on Christian Orthodoxy.    
For the GIS, we expected that VOSS and GIS Providence scores would be highly 
positively correlated since they access similar constructs.  We expected the VOSS Soul-Building 
and GIS Challenge subscales to be positively correlated for the same reason. VOSS Suffering 
God scores were expected to correlate positively to GIS Benevolence, since the Suffering God 
perspective emphasizes a benevolent God who shares in people’s experiences of suffering.  
Based on the previous research and the fact that most of these beliefs are not mutually exclusive, 
we expected many of the VOSS monotheistic subscales to be positively correlated with Christian 
Orthodoxy and the GIS subscales.   
For the WAS subscales, we hypothesized that the WAS Random and Luck scales would 
both be positively correlated to VOSS Random and negatively to VOSS Providence since the 
idea of a divine being who controls events is antithetical to the idea of randomness.  We expected 
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that WAS Justice and Controllability scores would correlate positively to VOSS Retribution 
scores since all of these assume that individual actions can impact outcomes, and that WAS Self-
Controllability would be negatively correlated to VOSS Random scores since belief in 
randomness implies that individuals cannot control their circumstances. 
We planned to analyze relationships between specific demographic variables and VOSS 
subscales to further examine the measure’s validity.  We anticipated that respondents from 
theistic religions (e.g., Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism) would have higher scores on 
theistic subscales than Atheists or Agnostics.  Since denomination is sometimes used a proxy for 
beliefs (Musick, 2000), we hypothesized that some of the beliefs central to specific 
denominations would be highly correlated to an individual’s membership in a specific Christian 
denomination (e.g., Baptists more likely to have high scores on Providence).   
We also hypothesized that there would be relationships between VOSS subscale scores 
and geography.  We planned to analyze VOSS scores in relation to general geographic regions of 
the United States known to have significant cultural differences and expected that Unorthodox 
and Random scores would be higher in less religious areas (e.g., the West and Northeast) and 
lower in areas where traditional Christian practices are still a cultural norm (e.g., the South, a.k.a. 
the “Bible Belt”).   
As with the previous VOSS validation study, we hypothesized that there could be 
relationships between VOSS subscales and an individual’s race or ethnicity (see Uecker, 
Regneres, & Vaaler, 2007, for more background).  We planned to test this with a one-way 
ANOVA, using the Games-Howell post-hoc tests because the assumption of equal variance was 
violated, given our unequal sample sizes.  Specifically, given Blacks’ typically higher levels of 
religiosity than non-Hispanic Whites (Pew Forum, 2008; Taylor, Chatters, Jayakody, & Levin, 
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1996) and the fact that the majority of Americans tend to be Christian, we expected to see 
relationships between race and theistic subscales such that Blacks would tend to score higher on 
the theistic VOSS subscales than Whites.  This is similar to assumptions that other studies have 
made along racial lines (e.g. Musick, 2000). 
Finally, we planned to analyze VOSS scores in relation to participants’ responses 
regarding social desirability.  We hypothesized that the VOSS subscales would not be related to 
specific patterns of socially desirable responding.  If this was not the case, we planned to conduct 
further analyses to determine if there was a particular group of respondents (e.g., religious 
affiliation, gender, age, race, etc.) for whom the VOSS (or a specific subscale within the VOSS) 
might not be a valid instrument.   
Study 1 Results 
Participants 
General demographics. A detailed breakdown of participant demographics grouped by 
religious affiliation appears in Table 2.  Overall, participants in Study 1 were 48.3% male 
(N=483) and 51.3% female (N=513).  They varied in age, with 29% (N=286) between 18-24 
years old, 38% (N=380) were 25-34, 15.7% (N=157) were 35-44, and 10.4% (N=104) reported 
being 45-54.  A remaining 6% (N=60) were 55-64 and 0.8% (N=8) were older than 64.  In terms 
of ethnicity, participants were 66.1% White Non-Hispanic (N=661), with 2.7% American 
Indian/Alaska Native (N=27), 12.9% Asian (N=129), 6.2% Black (N=62), 4.4% Hispanic or 
Latino (N=44), 1.1% Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (N=11), and 6.4% Biracial/Other (N=64).  
The sample was also economically diverse, with 6.7% earning $10k or less (N=67), 9.7 
earning $10k -$20k (N=97), 17.3% reporting $20k-$30k (N=173), 18.1% earning $40k-$50k 
(N=181), 18.4% reporting $50k-$60k (N=184), 15.8% earning $70k-$100k (N=158), and 12.9% 
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reporting more than $100k (N=129) in income.  Finally, participants lived throughout the United 
States.  Grouping them by geographic region showed that 34.7% (N=347) were from the South, 
19% (N=190) lived in the Midwest, 21.5% (N=215) were from the Northeast, 18% (N=180) 
were from the West Coast, and 6.6% (N=66) lived in the Southwest.  In terms of education, 1.7% 
(N=17) completed some high school, 9.6% (N=98) have a high school degree, and 33.7% 
(N=335) finished some college.  Another 37% earned a college degree, and the remaining 18% 
(N=175) had a graduate degree. 
Religious Demographics.  In keeping with the study’s recruitment goals, participants 
were religiously diverse.  The final sample included 11.1% (N=111) who identified as 
Atheist/Agnostic, 8.5% reported being Jewish (N=85), 9.6% identified as Muslim (N=96), 9.5% 
were Hindu (N=95), 9.8% were Buddhist (98), 22.6% identified as Catholic (N=226), and 26% 
were Protestant (N=260).  A detailed summary of religious variables grouped by religious 
affiliation is provided in Table 3.   
The majority of participants considered themselves moderately to very religious. 
Muslims self-identified as the most religious, with 31% saying they were “very religious,” and 
47% reporting they were “moderately religious.” Jews, Protestants, and Hindus reported lower 
levels of religiousness, with 19-20% “very religious” and 19-45% “moderately religious.”  Next 
came Catholics and Buddhists, with 8%-14% reporting they were “very religious” and “40-42% 
saying they were “moderately religious.”  Not surprisingly, none of the Atheist/Agnostic 
participants identified as “very religious,” and only 2% were “moderately religious.” 
Levels of spirituality varied between groups but were consistently higher than reported 
religiosity.  Protestants reported the highest levels of spirituality, with 44% identifying 
themselves as “very spiritual” and 38% as “moderately spiritual.” Muslims, Hindus, and 
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Buddhists all had similar levels, with 37%-38% of reporting they were “very spiritual” and 40%-
46% “moderately spiritual.” Catholics and Jews reported less spirituality (24-28% were “very 
spiritual” and 33-41% “moderately spiritual”). As with the previous self-ranking, 
Atheists/Agnostics’ levels of spirituality were the lowest, with 13% identifying as “very 
spiritual” and 12% as “moderately spiritual.”  
Participants also varied in their belief in God according to religious affiliations.  As with 
the self-ranking variables, Protestant and Muslim respondents reported the most belief in an 
individual God (20-26% chose “Although I sometimes question His existence, I do believe in 
God […]” and 63-67% reported, “I am sure God exists[…].”) The majority (68%-72%) of 
Hindus and Catholics also reported belief in a personal God, as did 50% of Jews. Buddhists 
tended to believe in a higher power (43%) rather than a personal God (27%).  Predictably, 
Atheist/Agnostics reported the lowest levels of belief in God; 70% either definitely did not 
believe or did not know if they would ever believe. 
Finally, participants from each religion reported having had religious or spiritual 
experiences that changed their lives.  More than half (51-57%) of Protestants, Muslims, and 
Hindus reported having had a life-changing religious or spiritual experience.  Fewer Jews, 
Buddhists and Catholics reported experiences (34-44%).  Of the Atheist/Agnostic respondents, 
14% reported having had a religious or spiritual experience that changed their lives.  Regardless 
of religious affiliation, the majority of the reported experiences (59-79%) occurred before the age 
of twenty-two.  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
Prior to beginning the factor analysis, we first tested the data to determine levels of 
missing data and whether the data were normally distributed. Missing data analyses showed that 
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all variables had less than 1.2% missing data so missing data points were addressed using 
listwise deletion.  Prior to analysis, data were examined for normality and results of the 
D’Agostino, Belanger, and D’Agostino (1990) test for normality with the Royston (1991) 
correction (Acock, 2012) indicated that all of the VOSS items had significant skew and kurtosis.  
Given the fact that we deliberately recruited a much larger number of Christians (Protestants and 
Catholics) than other religious groups, this non-normal distribution was not surprising.  All 
variables were transformed using either log or square root functions before being used in the 
factor analysis.  
After addressing the data distribution issue, we then analyzed the data using 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and tested the two best-fitting models identified in the 
VOSS’ earlier development (Hale-Smith et al., 2012).  First, using AMOS 20.0, a CFA using 
maximum-likelihood estimation was conducted to test a 10-factor model (Model 1) previously 
identified as having the best fit.  Second, we tested a model previously rejected in VOSS 
development but which had previously had strong fit indices.  This second model specified a 2nd 
order Traditional Christian Beliefs factor with each of the traditional Christian subscale variables 
as indicators (e.g. Divine Responsibility, Suffering God, Soul Building, Providence, etc.). 
Multiple fit indices were used to determine the acceptability of each model.  Standard 
cutoff recommendations were employed to determine levels of acceptable fit, including the 
comparative fit index (CFI), root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), and Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974).  There is some variation in what levels of fit are 
considered acceptable, but generally a CFI greater than .90 is considered acceptable (Bentler, 
1990; Finch & West, 1997) and greater than .95 is considered good (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  For 
the RMSEA statistic, levels should be lower than .08 (Browne, Cudeck, Bollen, & Long, 1993), 
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ideally less than .05 (Brown, 2006).   The AIC is used to compare the fit of non-nested models 
and a lower AIC should be chosen as the model that provides the best balance of fit and 
parsimony (Schumacker & Lomax, 1996).  In addition to these model fit statistics, we also 
examined the standardized regression weights to determine factor loadings for each item. 
Model 1.  Model 1 provided a good fit to the data, χ2 (1439.93) = 360, p< .000; χ2/df = 
4.0; CFI= .95; RMSEA=.06 (90% CI= .05-.06); AIC= 1709.93.  These model fit statistics fit well 
within the desired range for both CFI and RMSEA.  Standardized regression weights for all 
variables ranged from .6 to .9, indicating that in addition to reaching standards of good model fit, 
the items loaded strongly onto the expected factors. 
 Model 2. Model 2 did not fit the data as well as Model 1.  All the fit statistics for this 
model were much worse:  χ2 (3771.53) = 399, p< .000; χ2/df = 9.45; CFI= .83; RMSEA=.09 
(90% CI= .09-.10); (AIC= 3963.54).  In addition, to the poor statistics of CFI and RMSEA, the 
AIC for Model 2 was much higher than that of the previous model, further confirming the fact 
that this model does not fit the data.   
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability 
In this study, mean scores for individual subscales of the VOSS ranged from 6.01 (SE = 
.12) to 11.27 (SE = .14) and are outlined in Table 4.  Scores were generally lower than the 
subscale midpoint of 10.5, with standard deviations ranging from 3.65 (Unorthodox) to 4.77 
(Suffering God).  Reliabilities of all subscales were excellent, with all Cronbach’s alpha values 
within the recommended range of .7-.9 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994); they ranged from .72 
(Divine Responsibility) to .91 (Soul-Building).  Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for VOSS 
subscales divided by world religions. 
Convergent & Divergent Validity 
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After confirming that the VOSS’ factor structure was consistent with previous studies and 
that individual subscales demonstrated good reliability, we began examining the hypotheses 
outlined in the earlier data analytic section.  The majority of hypotheses were confirmed, with a 
few exceptions.  Table 6 outlines the relationships found between VOSS subscales, while Table 
7 presents VOSS subscale scores in relation to the other measures of interest. 
Most of the hypotheses regarding relationships between the VOSS scores themselves 
were confirmed.  As expected, all of the beliefs found in traditional Christianity and other 
monotheistic religions were positively correlated (p<.01).  Unorthodox beliefs were negatively 
correlated to all theistic subscales as predicted, with the exception of a positive correlation to 
Limited Knowledge (r=.40, p<.01).  Providence was also negatively correlated to Random 
beliefs, as hypothesized (r=-.34, p<.00).  
The relationships with other established measures also appeared as expected.  All the 
VOSS subscores based on traditional Christianity were positively correlated with Christian 
Orthodoxy scores.  VOSS Providence scores correlated positively to GIS Providence (r=.66, 
p<.01), and negatively to WAS Random (r=-.35, p<.01).  VOSS Soul-Building was similarly 
positively correlated to GIS Challenge (r=.67, p<.01), a stronger relationship than it had to any 
other subscale.  Similarly, VOSS Suffering God scores were related as predicted to GIS 
Benevolence (r=.53, p<.01).  As anticipated, all of the VOSS monotheistic subscales were 
positively correlated with Christian Orthodoxy and the GIS subscales.   
Our hypotheses about the VOSS Random and Retribution scores were also supported.  
VOSS Random scores were negatively correlated to Christian Orthodoxy scores, all GIS scales, 
and WAS Controllability scores at the level of p<.01 but were positively correlated to WAS 
Random (r=.68, p<.01) and WAS Luck (r=.10, p<.01).  In contrast to our hypothesis, Random 
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scores were also positively correlated to WAS Self-Controllability (r=.10, p<.01).  VOSS 
Retribution scores were positively correlated (r=.44, p<.01) to WAS Justice and Controllability 
(r=.40, p<.01) and negatively correlated with WAS Random scores (r=-.10, p<.01).    
Our hypotheses regarding VOSS subscales and demographics were also mostly 
confirmed. As predicted, Black participants scored significantly higher (p<.05) than White 
respondents on most theistic measures reflective of traditional Christian beliefs (i.e. Divine 
Responsibility, Providence, Soul-Building, Suffering God, Overcoming, and Encounter) and 
significantly lower (p<.05) than Whites on Unorthodox and Random subscales.  There were no 
significant racial differences between Blacks and Whites on the Limited Knowledge or 
Retribution subscales.    
Our hypotheses regarding where an individual lived were also supported.   Not 
surprisingly, participants in the South (a.k.a. “Bible Belt”) had lower rates of Unorthodox beliefs 
than participants on the West Coast as did those from the Midwest (both p<.05).  People on the 
West Coast had lower beliefs in Divine Responsibility and Overcoming regarding suffering, in 
contrast to those in the South (p <.05). 
Our hypotheses regarding how individuals’ beliefs in God and their religious affiliations 
would relate to their VOSS scores were also supported.  Individuals with higher levels of belief 
in God endorsed more belief in most traditional theistic scales (Divine Responsibility, 
Providence, Soul-Building, Suffering God, Overcoming, and Encounter) with significant 
differences between each level (p<.01).  Individuals with more belief in God generally endorsed 
fewer beliefs in Unorthodox or Random views of suffering (most p<.01), but there was some 
variation in those responses.  For example, there were no significant differences in the way that 
people who stated that they definitely believed in a personal God and people who definitely did 
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not believe in any God or higher power responded to questions related to unorthodox views of 
suffering.   
When we looked at the relationships between VOSS beliefs and religious affiliation, 
again most hypotheses were supported.  Results also indicated that there were significant 
differences in the way that adherents to the major world religions responded to specific beliefs 
even after covarying for age, gender, ethnicity, income, and education.  All of the subscales 
differed at significance levels of p<.01 when Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism 
and Atheists/Agnostics were compared.  Of particular importance for our validity testing, we 
found that individuals who identified themselves as Atheist/Agnostic were likely to have 
significantly higher VOSS Random scores than individuals from any other world religion.  
Similarly, Hindus and Buddhists were likely to have much higher scores than any other religious 
group on the VOSS Retribution subscale.  While not all differences between religious groups 
were significant, there was a general trend such that the monotheistic religions all endorsed 
higher levels of belief in the theistic items (i.e. Divine Responsibility, Providence, Soul-Building, 
Suffering God, Overcoming, Encounter, Limited Knowledge) while the non-monotheistic (i.e. 
Atheist/Agnostic, Buddhist, Hindu) religions tended to score lower on these items.  
Although there were not enough participants to run analyses by individual denomination, 
to facilitate analyses we were able to group Protestants by broad theological traditions (e.g. key 
teachings regarding holiness, predestination or the Holy Spirit; see Figure 1).  Groups were 
determined based on our knowledge of church history and the theological shifts that produced 
new denominations.  We chose to do this rather than grouping denominations on church polity or 
another characteristic because our construct of interest was beliefs.  
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After analyzing them by theological groups, we found that they generally did not vary 
significantly in their theistic beliefs. The only significant differences between denominations 
occurred in the Divine Responsibility and Limited Knowledge subscales.  For the former, 
Catholics reported lower scores than people grouped as Mainline Protestants, Charismatic 
Protestants, Historic Protestant Theology, or AME/African American Churches (all p<.05).  For 
Limited Knowledge, Charismatic Protestants had significantly lower scores (p<.05) than 
Catholics, Mainline Protestants, and other denominations.  Members of AME/African American 
Churches also reported lower scores on this subscale than Catholics, Anglicans, Mainline 
Protestants, Historic Protestants, and Protestants from other denominations (all p<.05).  
Participants from denominations endorsing theology from historic Protestant tradition tended to 
have higher scores on the Providence subscale as predicted, but this difference was not 
significant.  When an ANCOVA was run controlling for age, gender, ethnicity and income these 
findings remained significant 
VOSS Responses & Social Desirability 
In addition to examining the VOSS’ relationships with demographic variables and other 
established measures, we also tested for the potential impact of social desirability on VOSS 
responses using one-way ANOVAs. Sums of Overcoming tended to be higher for those with 
invalid social desirability scores, specifically for those who were categorized as “faking good” 
(i.e. presenting themselves in an overly positive light).  
Study 1 Discussion 
 Replication of factor analysis and reliability in multiple samples are essential in the 
measure development process, and it appears the VOSS has passed these tests with flying colors.  
This study confirms that the VOSS’ factor structure is strong, functions reliably, and appears to 
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be valid for use in the general United States population. 
The study replicates and extends information about the VOSS in several significant ways.  
First, the fact that the VOSS held its factor structure within this large, diverse sample and 
demonstrated excellent reliability suggests that the VOSS may be used outside of the college 
student population on which it was originally tested.  The VOSS factor structure proposed in its 
initial publication appears to be a good fit for the model and no adjustments were made in order 
to attain the desired fit indices.  The fact that the VOSS maintained its 10-factor structure and 
individual scales were reliable suggests that the subscales can indeed be used separately as 
originally designed.  This structure allows researchers to select individual scales based on what 
they think could be most relevant to their specific populations, and leaves open the possibility of 
developing new subscales for other religious groups whose beliefs are not currently represented 
within the VOSS.   
This study also indicates that the VOSS has adequate validity based on associations 
between subscales and associations with other established measures and demographic variables 
hypothesized to be connected to specific beliefs.  Most of our hypotheses regarding the VOSS 
were supported, with the exception of how the Limited Knowledge scale functioned. 
As outlined earlier, we found that the Limited Knowledge subscale was positively 
correlated to Unorthodox beliefs and had a curvilinear relationship with belief in God; it was also 
endorsed by fewer theologically conservative denominational groupings.  Although these 
relationships were not predicted, this does not necessarily imply that the Limited Knowledge 
subscale is invalid; rather, it suggests that our expectations as researchers were too narrow.  
The Limited Knowledge perspective as articulated in the VOSS does not explicitly state 
anything that would make it impossible for an individual to endorse an Unorthodox perspective: 
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the Unorthodox items focus on divine benevolence, whereas the Limited Knowledge questions 
center on divine foreknowledge.  An individual who does not believe in God’s benevolence 
could also reasonably reject belief in divine omniscience and/or foreknowledge.  
The way that Limited Knowledge appears to function differently from other theistic 
subscales actually reflects a broader tension within Christianity.  There are some who see Open 
Theism (the theological perspective upon which the Limited Knowledge subscale is based) as a 
doorway to more explicit heresy in which God’s omniscience would be rejected, but most Open 
Theists see themselves as being firmly planted within orthodox Christianity (Smith, 2005). 
Limited Knowledge’s complex relationship with both theistic and atheistic variables actually 
supports the subscale’s validity in a way we did not anticipate, showing clearly the variation 
within open theist beliefs.  
Our other unsupported hypotheses regarding VOSS subscales and denominational 
differences may also be conceptualized as an interesting reflection of American Christianity.  We 
had hypothesized that some of the VOSS subscales would be more strongly endorsed by specific 
denominations or denominational groupings because of the official theology associated with 
those denominations, but this was generally unsupported.  Although it is possible that the lack of 
pattern in how people respond based on denomination indicates that the VOSS is not a sensitive 
instrument, an alternative interpretation is that denomination is a relatively weak and imprecise 
proxy for belief.   
The research on denominational stability is mixed, with some research noting that up to 
44% of Americans have changed religious traditions (Pew, 2008) and others finding that these 
changes tend to be in the same denominational “families” (Hadaway & Marler, 1993). Given the 
VOSS’ otherwise strong validity in relation to other established measures and the knowledge that 
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Americans are not known to be loyal to specific denominations one likely explanation is that the 
individuals responding to the VOSS are not necessarily themselves firm believers of all the 
points of their denomination’s dogma. In addition to confirming the VOSS’ reliability and 
validity as a measure of beliefs about suffering, this study also raises some important points for 
future study of the psychology of religion.  It suggests that the study of beliefs should indeed 
focus on content of beliefs, and raises questions about the generalizability of research findings on 
“religion.”    
First, it would appear that the study of the content of beliefs does indeed have merit.  
When VOSS scores were analyzed by major religious group, there were significant differences 
on every subscale, with far too many differences to detail in this paper.   
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the variation in responses indicates the obvious: 
not all religions are the same, and we do them a disservice as researchers when we make this 
assumption.  There are significant differences in how people from different religious 
backgrounds interpret and respond to suffering.  Given this reality, researchers must learn to be 
much more circumspect with their claims.  Right now many studies claiming to study “religion” 
have primarily Christian samples with limited representation of other beliefs.  This is 
understandable given the U.S. religious demographics, but we must acknowledge that we have 
little idea of how different religions’ beliefs function in comparison to one another. As 
researchers we must be more forthcoming about limitations and make fewer assumptions about 
the generalizability of our findings.   
While it may be every researcher’s dream to have large samples in which multiple 
religions are represented with adequate power to examine minute differences, the reality is that 
most of us do not have access to those sorts of samples: in the United States, those participants 
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are usually Christian, because 78% identifies themselves as Christian (Pew, 2008).  This does not 
invalidate research findings to date, but it does suggest that assertions about “religion” when 
only one or two religious groups are represented may have limited generalizability.  Assuming 
that findings will prove equally true for people in other religions is simply not warranted, given 
the variation in beliefs and practices across religions and even within one religion (e.g., 
Christianity). 
Study 2 Overview 
In Study 2, we focused attention on the questions of whether the content of individuals’ 
beliefs about suffering related to their well-being and/or the stressful life experiences they had 
experienced, and whether or not those three factors are interrelated.  In order to capture a range 
of beliefs, we recruited participants outside of religious contexts, and in order to obtain the 
greatest number of life experiences we focused recruitment exclusively on senior citizens.  We 
surveyed participants at two time points three months apart, with the expectation that this would 
provide enough time to allow for change beliefs while minimizing attrition. 
Since this is the first research on this topic, we planned to examine relationships between 
VOSS subscales, life stress, and well-being using an exploratory framework.  We wanted to see 
if beliefs were stable between Time 1 and Time 2, but more importantly we needed to explore 
relationships between beliefs and well-being in the context with an open mind because we could 
think of several plausible but contrary hypotheses for most beliefs.  For example, beliefs in 
suffering as a random occurrence might be positively correlated to anxiety if a person believes he 
or she cannot predict or control negative events, or belief in randomness might be negatively 
correlated to anxiety because it could alleviate blame or guilt.    
We identified three main questions that we hoped to answer with this data.  First, are 
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beliefs associated with well-being? Within this broader question, we wondered if there might be 
interactions between beliefs and other religious factors that could moderate how beliefs impacted 
well-being, since previous research has identified moderating factors (e.g. Park, Cohen, & Herb, 
1990).  For example, we wondered if the extent to which an individual considered himself or 
herself religious might change the extent to which those beliefs were integrated into his or her 
life and had an effect on well-being. We also wondered if the way in which an individual 
perceived God might mediate how some of the monotheistic beliefs were experienced (e.g., 
anticipating an encounter with a punishing God would theoretically have different effects than 
anticipating an encounter with a loving God).   Although these were our primary research 
questions, we also planned to assess belief stability over time. Given that religious beliefs in 
older adults are thought to be relatively stable (Hamberg, 1991), we did not expect to see any 
significant differences between subscale means from Time 1 to Time 2.  
Our second main research question was whether beliefs about suffering related to 
participants’ life-experiences, and whether these two factors might predict well-being outcomes.  
In particular, we wondered if having had more stressful life experiences or a certain category of 
life experiences (e.g., interpersonal stressors) might predict some beliefs about suffering. We 
also hoped to examine whether experiencing new stressful life experiences (e.g., additional items 
on the LSC-R between Time 1 and Time 2) might change an individual’s beliefs. 
Our third main research question was related to relationships between beliefs about 
suffering and individuals’ perceptions of and reactions to stressors.  We wanted to see if an 
individual’s assessment of an intervening stressor at Time 2 might be predicted by their beliefs at 
Time 1, or if their assessment of the stressor could be predicted in any way by changes in belief 
that may have occurred between time points. We also wanted to see if perceptions of post-
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traumatic growth at Time 2 were associated with specific beliefs about suffering at Time 1 or by 
recent changes in belief.  Lastly, we wondered if there would be any differences in the way that 
people coped based on their beliefs. 
Methods 
Participants & Procedures  
Study 2 examined relationships between beliefs about suffering, well-being, and life 
experiences using a longitudinal sample of older adults recruited at senior citizens’ centers in the 
Northeast.  Older adults were chosen for this study because they were likely to have experienced 
a greater range of stressful events than would a younger sample, and a 3-month interval was 
selected for Time 1 and Time 2 in order to allow for possible changes of belief and new 
experiences while minimizing attrition. All adults at the senior centers were welcome to 
participate regardless of religious beliefs or other demographic variables, but individuals with 
obvious cognitive impairments (e.g. dementia, Alzheimer’s) or who were unable to read the 
questions for themselves were excluded.  
In order to enroll participants, researchers obtained permission to set up a table in a well-
trafficked area of each center on days with popular activities (e.g. lunches, exercise classes, card 
games, blood pressure clinics) and distributed recruitment flyers, information sheets and paper 
copies of the survey. Participants could either fill out the survey while at the center or could take 
home a stamped, addressed envelope and return the survey via postal mail.  Time 2 surveys were 
distributed three months after Time 1 either in person when the researchers returned to the senior 
center or via postal mail.   
In exchange for filling out each 20-minute survey, participants were given a $5 gift card 
to Dunkin Donuts.  In order to increase recruitment and retention, all participants were also 
  33
entered in three monthly raffles between Time 1 and Time 2 for the chance to win one of three 
$25 gift cards to CVS or Walgreens.  Surveys were identified only with ID numbers assigned in 
the order that participants were enrolled in order to protect participant confidentiality.   
Measures 
Demographic questionnaire.  Demographics included age, gender, race, marital status, 
income, and level of education.  Participants were also asked about their self-ranking regarding 
their level of religiousness or spirituality (Fetzer & NIA, 1999), their current religious 
preference, and belief in God (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975). Religious variables were included at 
both Time 1 and Time 2 and participants had the option of writing in their religious preference if 
it was not listed on the survey form. At Time 2 they were also asked if they had experienced any 
significant gains or losses in their religious faith since the last time they took the survey (Fetzer 
& NIA, 1999).   
Views of Suffering Scale (Hale-Smith et al., 2012).  The Views of Suffering Scale was 
included to measure beliefs about suffering at both Time 1 and Time 2.  Detailed information 
regarding the VOSS’ development and psychometrics is outlined earlier in this paper.   
Depression, Anxiety, & Stress Scale (DASS-21).  The DASS-21 (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995) was used as a quantitative measure of participant symptoms of distress at both 
Time 1 and Time 2.  The DASS-21 consists twenty-one items divided into three subscales 
measuring depression, anxiety and stress, and has been validated for used in research with older 
adults (Crawford & Henry, 2003; Crawford, Cayley, Lovibond, Wilson, & Hartley, 2011).  Items 
include statements such as “I found it hard to wind down,” “I felt that I had nothing to look 
forward to,” and “I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I was 
doing.” Responses are based on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (Did not apply to me at all) 
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to 4 (Applied to me very much, or most of the time) and participants are asked to consider the 
experiences of the previous week.  Responses may be summed to provide scores on a continuum 
or a cutoff may be used to identify a level of severity ranging from Normal to Extremely Severe.  
Higher scores indicate greater symptom severity.  Previous studies indicate that the DASS-21 
had acceptable psychometrics with reliability alphas of .81-.91 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).  
Cronbach’s alphas for the DASS-21 in this sample were .72-.84. 
Positive States of Mind Scale (PSOMS). The PSOMS (Adler, Horowitz, Garcia, & 
Moyer, 1998; Horowitz, Adler, & Kegeles, 1988) was also used as a measure of participant well-
being at both Time 1 and Time 2.  The PSOMS is a seven-item questionnaire measuring seven 
mental states including ability to focus, be productive, care for one’s self or another person, 
relax, share with others, and experience positive sensual nonsexual and sexual pleasures.  The 
scale has been well-validated in multiple studies and has consistently demonstrated good 
reliability (Adler et al., 1998).  Responses are based on the previous week and utilize a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 0 (unable to experience this even though I have wanted to) to 3 (easy 
to experience) with 4 being (not relevant – have not wanted to experience it) (Park, 2008). The 
PSOMS is scored such that a higher score indicates more positive experiences; responses of not 
relevant do not influence the overall score but may be considered separately.  Previous studies 
indicate that the PSOMS had acceptable psychometrics with reliability alphas of .65-.74 (Adler 
et al., 1998).  Cronbach’s alpha in this sample was .77. 
SF-12.  The SF-12 (Ware, Kosinski, & Keller, 1996) was used to measure both physical 
and mental health at both Time 1 and Time 2.  The SF-12 has been validated on both general and 
medical adult populations (Ware et al., 1996). An abbreviated version of the SF-36 (McHorney, 
Ware, & Raczek, 1993), the SF-12 consists of twelve items and provides a standardized Physical 
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Component Score (PCS) and Mental Component Score (MCS).  The PCS measures physical 
functioning, physical role fulfillment, bodily pain and vitality, while the MCS measures social 
functioning, emotional role fulfillment, and mental health.  Items on the PCS include questions 
such as “During the past 4 weeks, how much did pain interfere with your normal work (including 
both work outside the home and housework)?” where responses include not at all, a little bit, 
moderately, quite a bit, or extremely.  Items on the MCS include questions such as “How much 
of the time during the past 4 weeks have you felt calm and peaceful?” where responses include 
all of the time, most of the time, a good bit of the time, some of the time, a little of the time, or 
none of the time. Both the PCS and MCS scores range from 0 to 100, with higher scores 
indicating better functioning.  Results from previous studies (Ware et al., 1996) showed average 
PCS scores ranging from 36.34 +/- 1.6 (a sample with serious physical and mental health 
conditions) to 49.32 +/- 0.9 (a sample with mental health but no physical concerns).  Average 
MCS scores ranged from 37.03 +/- 1.1 (a sample with mental health conditions) to 53.82 +/- 0.3 
(a sample with minor medical conditions and no identified mental health concerns). 
Life Stressor Checklist – Revised (LSC-R). The LSC-R (Wolfe, Kimerling, Brown, & 
Chrestman, 1996) was used at both Time 1 and Time 2 to measure stressful life events.  The 
LSC-R consists of thirty items identifying stressful events that participants may have 
experienced in their lifetime. Questions include exposure to natural disasters, interpersonal 
trauma (e.g. sexual abuse), personal stressors (e.g. divorce, incarceration, serious financial 
problems), and more general stressors (e.g. parental divorce, a close family member going to 
jail). In order to reduce participant burden, the simplest recommended scoring method of adding 
responses together into a single summed score was utilized; participants answered with a yes/no 
response to each stressful event.  Given this, we expected that Time 2 summed scores should be 
  36
either the same or higher than those at Time 1, if any stressors measured by the LSC-R had 
occurred in the 3-month interim between time points.   
Attitudes Toward God Scale (ATGS). The ATGS (Wood et al., 2010) was included at 
both Time 1 and Time 2 to measure participants’ experiences of religious comfort and struggle.  
The ATGS consists of 9 items divided into two factors, (1) Positive Attitudes toward God and 
(2) Disappointment and Anger with God.  Responses are based on an 11-point Likert Scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely).  Participants are instructed to rate each item to the 
extent that they currently do or feel about God or whatever they call the sacred. Sample items 
include statements such as “Trust God to protect and care for you” (Positive Attitudes subscale) 
and “Feel that God has let you down” (Disappointment and Anger with God subscale).  Items 
from each subscale are summed to provide separate scores of positive and negative attitudes such 
that higher scores indicate higher levels of each factor.  Previous studies report that the ATGS 
has excellent reliability; the Positive Attitudes alphas ranged from .89 to .99 across six studies, 
while the Disappointment and Anger with God alphas ranged from .64 to .93 (Wood et al., 
2010).  The Positive Attitudes Cronbach’s alpha for this study was .96 and the Disappointment 
and Anger with God alpha was .80. 
Life Orientation Test – Revised (LOT-R). The LOT-R (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 
1994) was included in the Time 1 survey to assess individual optimism and pessimism.  The 
scale consists of ten items, four of which are filler items and thus not included in the final score.  
Responses are based on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).  
Sample items include statements such as “In uncertain times, I usually expect the best” and “If 
something can go wrong for me it will” (reverse scored). The LOT-R provides a single score of 
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optimism using the six items of interest, where a higher score indicates more optimism while a 
lower score indicates more pessimism.  Cronbach’s apha for the LOT-R was .60.    
Evaluating new stressors.  Four questions were included in the Time 2 survey to assess 
the impact of a stressor between time points.  The first question asked participants to identify the 
greatest stressor they encountered since the last time they took the survey.  Next participants 
were asked to identify when the event took place (within the last month, within the last three 
months, within the last year and since then, it has been going on for more than 1 year but has 
continued less than 3 years, it has been going on for more than 3 years, it has been going on for 
more than 5 years).  Finally, participants were asked how stressful the event was when it first 
occurred (initial stress appraisal) and how stressful it is for them now (current stress appraisal) 
(responses for each included options of not at all, a little bit, moderately, quite a bit, and 
extremely). 
Brief RCOPE. The positive religious coping subscale of the Brief RCOPE (Fetzer & 
NIA, 1999) was also included at Time 2 to assess individuals’ religious coping strategies in 
response to the stressor they identified.  The Brief RCOPE usually includes two subscales 
(positive and negative religious coping), but in order to reduce participant burden only the 
positive coping strategies subscale was used in the Time 2 survey.  Participants are instructed to 
think about how they understand and deal with the previously identified stressor and indicate to 
what extent each coping strategy is involved in the way they cope.  Responses are based on a 4-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (a great deal) to 4 (not at all).  Sample items include 
statements such as “I work together with God as partners to get through hard times” and “I 
confess my sins and ask for God’s forgiveness.”  Cronbach’s alpha for the RCOPE in this sample 
was .91.   
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Brief COPE. The Brief COPE (Carver, 1997) was included at Time 2 to assess 
participants’ coping strategies.  The Brief COPE consists of twenty-eight items assessing 
fourteen coping strategies.   Strategies outlined in the Brief COPE include active coping, 
planning, positive reframing, acceptance, humor, religion, using emotional support, using 
instrumental support, self-distraction, denial, venting, substance use, behavioral disengagement, 
and self-blame.  Participants were asked to think about the stressor they previously identified and 
then respond to each statement about a specific coping strategy using a 4-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (haven’t been doing this at all) to 4 (doing this a lot).   Sample statements include 
“I’ve been turning to work or other activities to take my mind off things,” and “I’ve been getting 
emotional support from others, and I’ve been saying things to let my unpleasant feelings escape.”  
Previous studies indicated the Brief COPE subscales had acceptable psychometrics with 
reliability alphas for most scales between .7-.9; five of the subscales (positive reframing, 
acceptance, using instrumental support, denial, and venting) had alphas of .5-.6 (Carver, 1997). 
Previous studies indicate that the Brief COPE had acceptable psychometrics with 
reliability alphas of .65-.9  Cronbach’s alphas in this sample ranged from .49 (Behavioral 
Disengagement) to .89 (Religion); the former was the only scale with reliability less than .60.  
Post-Traumatic Growth Inventory - Short Form (PTGI-SF).  Post-traumatic growth 
was assessed with the PTGI-SF (Cann et al., 2010) at Time 2.  The PTGI-SF consists of ten 
items representing five subscales of the original PTGI (two items per subscale).  Factors include 
relating to others, new possibilities, personal strength, spiritual change, and appreciation of life. 
Sample statements regarding potential growth include, “I have a greater appreciation for the 
value of my own life” and “I have a greater sense of closeness with others.” Responses are made 
on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (I did not experience this change) to 5 (I experienced 
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this change to a very great degree). Participants were asked consider the stressor identified 
earlier and indicate how relevant each statement was in light of their stressor.  Previous studies 
indicate that the PTGI-SF reliability alpha coefficients are good, ranging from .72 to .89.  
Cronbach’s alpha for the current sample was .94.   
Data Analytic Plan 
We planned to analyze the data with cross-sectional analyses and longitudinal modeling 
techniques using Stata 12.0, SPSS 20.0, and AMOS 20.0. Before beginning analyses, we 
determined that we would examine the data for attrition patterns and missing data, then assess for 
differences in beliefs based on demographic group using ANOVAs.  
We planned to begin exploring our first question (i.e., if beliefs are related to well-being) 
in the cross-sectional data by looking at linear relationships between VOSS subscales and well-
being variables using bivariate correlations.  Next we would use moderated mediation models to 
assess direct, indirect and total effects with religious variables (i.e. level of self-identified 
religiousness) as a moderator.  We planned to test models incorporating each of the VOSS 
subscales and well-being outcomes individually, a total of sixty models.   
Another part of this question regarded changes in beliefs, and here we decided to use 
multiple regression to analyze whether changes in VOSS subscale scores predicted changes in 
well-being.  Finally, we planned to conclude our analyses of beliefs’ relationships with well-
being by analyzing cross-lag models for each VOSS subscale and outcome variable (i.e., Time 1 
beliefs predict Time 2 well-being and vice versa).  
To answer our second broad research question regarding the relationships between life 
experiences, beliefs and well-being we again planned to use a mixture of cross-sectional and 
longitudinal analyses.  We planned to first look at correlations between the number of life 
  40
stressors and beliefs, and correlations between interpersonal life stressors and beliefs.  Following 
this we planned to examine moderated mediation models to test whether life experiences 
moderated the relationships between beliefs and well-being in any meaningful ways.  We 
intended to assess relationships between changes in number of life stressors and well-being using 
multiple regression, to see if changes in life experiences would predict changes in beliefs.  
Finally, in order to answer our third research question of whether beliefs about suffering 
are related to individuals’ perceptions of and reactions to stressors we planned to use multiple 
regression.  We intended to analyze relationships between beliefs and evaluations of stressors, 
beliefs and perceptions of growth, and beliefs and coping behaviors. 
Study 2 Results 
Attrition and Data Cleaning  
Of the 307 participants who completed the Time 1 survey, 72.6% (N=223) completed 
Time 2.  This attrition rate of 27% is consistent with other longitudinal studies involving adults 
of this age (e.g., Young, Powers, & Bell, 2006).  We conducted chi-square tests to determine if 
there were relationships in any demographic factors between those who remained and those who 
dropped out of the study. There were no significant differences for completers vs. non-
completers for any demographic variables (i.e. age, gender, race, marital status, education) or 
religious variables (belief in God, self-ranking of self as religious or spiritual, current religious 
preference).  There were also no significant differences (all p >.05) in attrition status based on 
participants’ scores on the well-being measures (DASS-21, SF-12, PSOMS).   
After assessing attrition, we then examined the data for missingness. At Time 1, a high 
percentage of participants (45.3%, N=139) chose not to respond to the question regarding their 
income. Of the demographic variables, the only others with >5% of missing data were 
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participants’ level of education (10.4% missing, N=32), whether or not they were Hispanic 
(9.1% missing, N=28), and current religious preference (5.2% missing, N=16).  Of the VOSS 
variables, the second item on the Retribution subscale (“Karma is the best explanation for 
individuals’ suffering”) had an unusually high percentage of missing data (18.2%, N=56; all 
other VOSS variables had 5-11% missing data).  Based on informal conversations with 
participants and several comments written in the margins next to this question, some participants 
were unsure what the word “karma” meant and so chose not respond.  Of the variables calculated 
at Time 1 (e.g., PCS and MCS subscale scores of the SF-12, subscales of the DASS-21), none 
had more than 15% missing data.  
At Time 2, a similar pattern of missingness emerged; the same Retribution item on the 
VOSS had 18.8% (N=42) missing data.  The VOSS item with the next highest percentage of 
missingness was the final item in the Divine Responsibility subscale “When we suffer, God does 
God’s best within chosen boundaries” (15.2% missing, N=34 compared to 9.1%, N=28) at Time 
1).   As before, no other variables calculated at Time 2 had more than 15% missing data.   
Lastly, we considered whether or not it would be appropriate to transform variables prior 
to analyzing them. Using Stata, we assessed the distribution of all variables.  Many variables had 
significant skewness, but analyses indicated that for almost all of them an identity transformation 
was recommended.  
Participants  
General demographics. Participants for Study 2 were 74.6% female (N=229) and 24.8% 
male (N=76).  Participant ages ranged from 55 to 97 (M= 74, S.D. = 8.6) and incomes from 
$9,500 per year to $200,000 per year (M= $44,278, S.D.=$28,771).  Regarding marital status, 
40.7% (N=125) of participants were married, 8.1% (N=25) were single, 2.3% (N=7) were 
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cohabitating, 15.3% (N=47) were divorced, and 30.3% (N=93) were widowed.  Participants’ 
educational background varied, with 10.7% (N=33) having some high school, 26.1% (N=80) a 
high school diploma, 19.5% (N=60) had some college or vocational training, 2.3% (N=7) had an 
associate’s degree, 11.7% (N=36) had a bachelor’s degree, and 19.2% (N=59) had a graduate 
degree.   
Religious demographics. Detailed information regarding participant religious 
demographics is presented in Table 8.  Of the 307 participants, 44.3% (N=136) identified 
themselves as Catholic and 28.7% as Protestant (N=88).  This high percentage of Christian 
participants is consistent with national averages for the United States (Pew, 2008).  Of the 
Protestants in this sample, the denomination with the highest percentage of participants was the 
United Church of Christ (UCC) with 14.3% (N=44).  An additional 4.2% (N=13) identified 
themselves as Episcopal/Anglican and 4.6% (N=14) identified as Methodist.  
When religious changes between Time 1 and Time 2 were analyzed, we found that 
reports of self-ranked spirituality were consistent (T1 M=3.08, SD=.84 vs. T2 M=3.14, SD=.85; 
t(204)1.45, p=.15), but self-ranked religiosity was significantly lower at Time 2 (T1 M=3.03, 
SD=.84 vs. T2 M=2.94, SD=.82; t(221) 2.70, p=.01).  Interestingly, when perceptions of 
religious gains and losses during the last three months were assessed using cross-sectional data at 
Time 2, the opposite effect was reported:  32% (N=69) of participants reported experiencing a 
gain in their faith while 5.85% (N=12) reported experiencing a loss of faith.  Attitudes towards 
God (ATGS) scores were not significantly different between the two time points. 
VOSS scores at Time 1 were generally consistent across gender, with a few exceptions 
(Table 9).  Men had significantly higher scores on Unorthodox beliefs (M=2.13, SD= 1.36) than 
women (M=1.69, SD= 1.10; t(107) 2.56, p=.01).  Women had higher scores on Encounter beliefs 
  43
(M=3.77, SD=1.27) than men (M= 3.43, SD=1.20; t(295) 2.08, p=.03) and also endorsed more 
Suffering God beliefs (M=4.00, SD= 1.59) than men (M=3.35, SD= 1.57; t(292) 3.07, p<.00).  
There were no significant differences in beliefs by any other demographic variables (e.g. age, 
income, marital status, education).  Correlations between VOSS subscales are presented in Table 
10.  
Participant stress appraisals.  Participant responses at Time 2 included identification of 
the most stressful event experienced since Time 1, a rating of both how stressful it was initially 
and how stressful it was at present, and how long the stressor had been taking place.  Participants 
reported a wide range of stressors (see Table 11) including airline travel delays, health concerns, 
relational stress, financial difficulties, national safety concerns (e.g. Boston bombing, school 
shooting), and personal loss (e.g., death of a spouse).  Of these, 31% (N=60) reported the event 
had occurred within the last month, 29% (N=55) within the last three months, 14% (N=26) 
within the last year and continued, 8% (N=16) more than one but less than three years ago, 6% 
(N=11) more than three years ago, and 12% (N=23) said the event had initially occurred more 
than five years before but continued to be a stressor.   
Participant life experiences. Participant life experiences were assessed by using the Life 
Stressors Checklist-Revised (LSC-R).  Table 12 provides an overview of the positive Time 1 
responses organized by gender. The mean number of stressors reported by participants at Time 1 
was 5.76 (S.D.=3.87), with a range of 0-24. Although it is not a traditional scoring procedure for 
this instrument, in addition to creating a total sum of life stressors we also summed specifically 
interpersonal stressors (e.g. physical or sexual abuse, abandonment by attachment figures), since 
the literature suggests that these trauma may be the most impactful (e.g., Nishith, Mechanic, & 
Resick, 2000), and that there is a connection between human relationships and individuals’ 
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perceptions of the human/divine relationship (Hill & Hall, 2002).  At Time 1, the mean number 
of interpersonal stressors was .94 (SD=1.58) with a range of 0 to 9.    
It should be noted that a data collection error occurred for some of the participants at 
Time 1 that may mean that the actual number of stressors experienced for some of the males was 
higher than reported.  When response patterns were reviewed mid-way through Time 1 data 
collection, it was clear that some male participants were confused by the “For Women Only” 
direction on the question regarding whether or not they had experienced a miscarriage or 
abortion.  Some men apparently responded to that direction by not filling out any items 
appearing after that question, while others continued with the questionnaire as anticipated.  Study 
personnel clarified directions with subsequent participants and at Time 2, but it is likely that the 
actual number of male participants who experienced the events listed after the 
miscarriage/abortion question is higher than measured at Time 1.   
Although we included the LSC-R in the Time 2 survey, because of an unexpected 
response pattern raising significant questions of reliability, we decided not to analyze the Time 2 
LSC-R data.  The LSC-R was the last measure in the Time 2 study packet and seems likely that 
was related to participant fatigue, since 43.7% of participants (N=94) reported fewer life 
stressors at Time 2 than they did at Time 1, even though any changes should have been in the 
positive direction (i.e., more stressors). Given these concerns we decided not to use LSC-R Time 
2 data independently or to create change scores, so all analyses reported involving the LSC-R 
involved only Time 1 data. 
Examining the data for possible confounds  
Prior to analyzing relationships between the VOSS and our variables of interest, we used 
ANOVAs and bivariate correlations explore possible overlaps between constructs of interest and 
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identify possible confounding variables.  We also used ANOVAs to assess for relationships 
between the means of VOSS subscales based on demographic factors.  Analyses indicated that 
there were significant differences based on gender for Unorthodox, Encounter, and Suffering 
God means such that males had higher Unorthodox means (p<.05) and females had higher 
Encounter (p<.05) and Suffering God (p<.01) means.  Asian participants also tended to have 
higher Retribution means than White participants (p<.05). 
Next, we looked at the religious variables to determine whether we needed to include all 
of them in our analyses or whether we could be more selective.  As we suspected, many of the 
religious variables were strongly related.  Self-ranked religiousness and spirituality were highly 
correlated (r=.59, p<.01), and belief in God was similarly correlated with both self-ranked 
religiousness (r=.66, p<.01) and self-ranked spirituality (r=.50, p<.01).  Positive attitudes 
towards God were correlated with all three (self-ranked religiousness r=.59, p<.01; self-ranked 
spirituality r=.52, p<.01; belief in God r=.67, p<.01).  The only religious variable unrelated to 
the rest was negative attitudes towards God.  Given the strong correlations between religious 
variables we decided to focus our analyses only on measures of self-reported religiousness (since 
the beliefs we were measuring are based on religious traditions) and negative attitudes towards 
God.   
Question 1: Are beliefs about suffering related to well-being?   
Our first research question centered on whether or not beliefs about suffering were 
associated with well-being.  Given the complex findings in the literature related to religion and 
well-being we wondered if the effect of beliefs might be mediated by one or more variables.    
We also thought that it seemed likely that there might also be moderation effects based on the 
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individual’s level of religiosity, such that religious beliefs might be more salient for those who 
considered themselves religious than those who did not.   
In order to identify possible mediating variables, we looked at correlations between well-
being variables and our other constructs of interest (optimism, religious variables) (Table 13). 
We found that optimism was negatively correlated to depression (p < .05, r = -.38), anxiety (p < 
.00, r = -.31), and stress (p < .05, r = -.39), and was positively correlated with positive states of 
mind (p < .05, r = -.37).  Negative attitudes towards God were also positively correlated with 
depression (r=.26, p<.01), anxiety (r=.18, p<.05), and stress (r=.27, p<.01), and were negatively 
correlated with mental health as measured by SF-12 (r=-.27, p<.05) and positive states of mind 
(r=-0.23, p<.01).   
Next we looked at correlations between the VOSS and well-being (Table 14) and 
between the VOSS and possible mediators.  We did not plan our analyses exclusively around 
these correlations, however, since significant indirect effects are often initially obscured 
(MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009). We found that optimism was negatively correlated to 
Unorthodox (r=-.27, p<.01), Retribution (r=-.12, p<.05), and Limited Knowledge (r=-.14, p<.05), 
but positively to Suffering God (r=-.13, p<.05) beliefs. We also found that negative attitudes 
toward God were positively related to Unorthodox (r=.34, p<.01), Retribution (r=.13, p<.05), 
and Limited Knowledge (r=.16, p<.01) beliefs. 
After determining that optimism and negative attitudes towards God should be 
considered as possible mediators in any analyses, we created a series of structural equation 
models in Stata.  Our models included optimism and negative attitudes towards God as 
mediators, individual religious self-ranking as a moderating variable, one of the VOSS subscales 
as an independent variable, and one of the well-being outcomes as the dependent variable 
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(Figure 2). In order to correct for bias, we used bootstrapping (5000 iterations) to obtain bias-
corrected p values and Z scores standard errors, and confidence intervals. 
Moderated mediation models of beliefs, well-being, and religiosity.  In our first set of 
models, we tested the effects of non-monotheistic beliefs (Unorthodox, Random, Retribution) on 
well-being.  We found that for participants who were not or were only moderately religious, 
Unorthodox beliefs (Table 15) had indirect effects mediated mostly by optimism, although 
negative attitudes towards God were a mediator of mental health.  Participants who identified as 
the most religious appeared to be sometimes buffered from the negative effects of these beliefs, 
although not always.   The only measure of well-being that Unorthodox beliefs did not predict 
was physical health.  There were no significant direct or indirect effects for Random or 
Retribution beliefs (Table 16), though there was a total effect on positive states of mind in a 
negative direction (b=-.03, p<0.05).   
There was a range of effects for the traditional monotheistic beliefs (Table 16).  Divine 
Responsibility and Limited Knowledge both had interaction effects but no mediated relationships. 
Divine Responsibility had a direct negative effect on physical health (b=-3.27, p<.05) as well as 
an interaction with religious self-ranking (b= .98, p< .05; Figure 3).  It also had a direct positive 
relationship with better mental health (b= 2.7, p<.05).  None of the Divine Responsibility 
relationships were mediated by optimism or negative attitudes towards God.  For Limited 
Knowledge beliefs, there were no indirect effects but the total effects for people with moderate 
religiosity were significant such that stronger Limited Knowledge beliefs were associated with 
increases in depression (b=.40, p<0.05) and stress (b=.50, p<.05).  As with Divine Responsibility, 
there was also an interaction effect with religiosity predicting physical health (Figure 4). 
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Finally, Providence beliefs did not have any direct or indirect effects, but at moderate 
levels of religiosity there were total effects predicting poorer well-being with higher rates of 
depression (b=.31 p<.05) and stress (b=.41, p=0.017), with lower mental health (b=-.34, p<.05), 
and positive states of mind (-.03, p<.05). Overcoming beliefs had a direct positive effect on 
mental health (b= 2.53 p<.05), with no indirect or total effects.  Suffering God beliefs had a 
direct positive effect on mental health (b=2.92, p<.05).  They also had negative indirect (b=-.46, 
p<.05), and total (b=-.52, p<.05) effects on stress for those with the strongest levels of religiosity, 
and positive indirect (b=.03, p<.05) and total (b=.04, p<.05) effect on positive states of mind for 
those with the highest levels of religiosity. There were no direct, indirect, or total effects for 
Encounter or Soul-Building beliefs.   
Changes in beliefs and well-being. Before analyzing changes in beliefs we first 
examined the stability of VOSS means.  Using paired t-tests we found that Unorthodox, 
Retribution, Providence, Encounter, Overcoming, Suffering God, and Soul-Building beliefs were 
stable with no significant differences between the means at Time 1 and 2.  Of the three beliefs 
that changed between time points, Random (t=1.71, p=0.04) and Divine Responsibility (t=12.20, 
p<.01) beliefs both had significantly lower means at Time 2 while Limited Knowledge beliefs (t 
= -11.76, p<.01) had a significant increases. There were no significant correlations between 
changes in belief and measures of well-being, coping, attitudes towards God, post-traumatic 
growth reports, and stress-appraisals after Bonferroni corrections were applied.   
Next, we analyzed whether change scores for beliefs about suffering predicted changes in 
well-being.  We found that increases in Encounter beliefs Time 1 and Time 2 were also related to 
increases in stress (b=.90, p=0.01).  Increases in Overcoming beliefs were also significantly 
related to decreases in PSOMS scores (b= -.07, p=0.02).  In addition to these significant results, 
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there were two trends: increases in Suffering God beliefs coincided with improvements in mental 
health as measured by the SF-12 (b=.91, p<.06), and increases in Soul-Building beliefs were 
related at the level of a trend to decreases in PSOMS scores (b=-.05 p=0.06). 
Cross-lag models. The final longitudinal analyses conducted were cross-lag models 
examining how beliefs and well-being at Time 1 and Time 2 predicted beliefs and well-being at 
Time 2 (see Figure 5 for an example).  Sixty different models were tested combining the ten 
VOSS subscales and six well-being outcomes.  All the models reached standards of good fit with 
a CFI >.95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999) and RMSEA>.08 (Browne et al., 1993) many with almost 
perfect fit indices.  When individual relationships were analyzed, however, it was clear that the 
driving force for the exceptional fit indices were the strong associations between Time 1 and 
Time 2 relationships between each construct.  Most of the relationships between beliefs and 
well-being at Time 1 and Time 2 were insignificant.  
For nine of the models, beliefs or well-being at Time 1 had a significant correlation to the 
Time 2 responses of the other factor.  Depression, anxiety, PSOMS, and physical health at Time 
1 were all predictive of beliefs at Time 2 after controlling for Time 1 beliefs.  Greater depression 
at Time 1 predicted more Retribution (b =.13, p<.05) and Overcoming at T2 (b = .11 p< .05).  
Higher anxiety at Time 1 predicted more Retribution beliefs at T2 (b =.15, p< .05).  Lower 
PSOMS scores at Time 1 predicted stronger Retribution (b =-.14, p<.05) and Limited Knowledge 
beliefs at Time 2 (b =-.12, p<.05).  Poorer physical health at Time 1 predicted stronger 
Encounter (b =-.15, p<.05) and Overcoming (b=-.15, p<.05) beliefs at Time 2.   
Some beliefs at Time 1 also predicted well-being at Time 2 after controlling for Time 1 
well-being.  More Limited Knowledge beliefs at Time 1 predicted lower PSOMS at Time 2 (b =-
.12, p<.05), while greater Divine Responsibility beliefs at Time 1 predicted higher Stress at T2 (b 
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=.11, p<.05).  Lastly, stronger Suffering God beliefs at Time 1 predicted lower PSOMS at Time 2 
(b =-.11, p<.05). 
Question 2: Life Stressors (LSC-R) & VOSS Predicting Well-Being 
Next we analyzed relationships between VOSS subscales and stressful life events as 
measured by the LSC-R.  When an individual’s total number of life stressors was summed and 
correlated with each of the VOSS subscales, there were no significant correlations. When the 
sum of only interpersonal stressors (i.e., those perpetrated by another person) was considered, a 
significant negative correlation appeared between the number of interpersonal stressors people 
had experienced and Random beliefs (r=-.12, p<.05), indicating that people who had experienced 
more interpersonal stressors were less likely to believe that suffering occurred randomly.  
Next we examined whether the cumulative number of individual life stressors might 
serve as a moderator in religious beliefs’ relationships with well-being.  As before, we used 
structural equation models in which optimism and negative attitudes toward God served as 
possible mediators, with either total number of life stressors or total number of interpersonal 
stressors as the moderator variable (Figure 6).   
Consistent with all previous analyses, the non-traditional monotheistic beliefs all had 
negative effects, if any at all. Unorthodox beliefs were associated with poorer well-being across 
multiple analyses both with indirect and total effects (Table 17).  Stronger Unorthodox beliefs 
mediated by optimism predicted greater depression, anxiety, and stress.  They were also 
associated with reduced mental health, but mediated by negative attitudes towards God.   In this 
model Unorthodox beliefs also had a direct negative effect on positive states of mind.  Random 
beliefs had no effects, but for people with the fewest number of stressors Retribution beliefs 
(mediated by optimism) predicted higher rates of depression (Table 18).  They were also related 
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to higher anxiety, stress and decreased positive states of mind for all but people who had 
experienced the most number of stressors.   
Among the traditional monotheistic beliefs a variety of effects emerged when total 
number of life stressors was a moderator, including several clear predictors of poorer well-being 
(Table 18). Limited Knowledge beliefs were a predictor of higher depression (mediated by 
optimism for everyone except for those with the most number of life stressors) and stress 
(mediated by negative attitudes towards God for those with the highest number of life stressors). 
Providence beliefs were related to negative outcomes for those with the least number of life 
stressors:  their total effects were predictive of greater depression and stress, in addition to a 
negative relationship with mental health that was mediated by negative attitudes toward God. 
Encounter beliefs were also a direct predictor of poorer physical health in this model (b=-1.98, 
p<.05). 
Not all beliefs predicted poorer health with life stressors as a moderator.  Divine 
Responsibility had positive relationships with well-being for people who had experienced the 
most number of stressors, predicting lower depression and anxiety in relationships that were 
mediated by optimism. Suffering God beliefs were also associated with better well-being via 
optimism: for people who had experienced a moderate number of stressors they predicted lower 
stress and more positive states of mind.  There were no effects for Overcoming beliefs.  
For Soul-Building beliefs, the relationships were complex with both a direct negative 
effect on positive states of mind (b=-0.14,  p<.01), and an interaction effect. We found that 
although for individuals with a low number of life stressors having low Soul-Building beliefs was 
associated with more positive states of mind, as the number of stressors increased Soul-Building 
beliefs were associated with more stable well-being (Figure 7).    
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For our last set of analyses related to life stressors, we examined the effects of belief on 
well-being, with the total number of interpersonal stressors (e.g. abuse perpetrated by another 
person, interpersonal stressors such as divorce), a subset of the total stressors that we thought 
might be more potent and have a slightly different profile of results.  Results of these analyses 
are presented in Tables 19 and 20 and are generally consistent with the first set of life stressor 
analyses, but with a few exceptions.   
Unorthodox beliefs mirrored the earlier results of the analyses where total life stressors 
was the moderator – they were related to higher rates of depression, anxiety, stress, and fewer 
positive states of mind (via optimism), and lower mental health scores (via negative attitudes 
toward God) for everyone except those with the fewest number of interpersonal stressors (Table 
19).  As before, there were no effects for Random beliefs.   
Unlike with the previous analyses, Retribution beliefs were only related to increased 
anxiety and stress for those with moderate numbers of interpersonal stressors (Table 20).  In 
addition, there was an interaction effect: at low levels of interpersonal stressors Retribution 
beliefs were associated with better mental health, but for those with the highest number of 
interpersonal life stressors there was a dramatic difference such that having strong Retribution 
beliefs was strongly associated with much lower mental health scores (Figure 8).  
As before, Divine Responsibility and Suffering God had positive effects (Table 20).  
Divine Responsibility was associated with lower rates of depression (mediated by optimism for 
those who had experienced the most interpersonal stressors). Suffering God beliefs were also 
associated with lower stress levels, mediated by optimism (b=-.27, p<.05). 
Finally, as before, Limited Knowledge, Providence, and Encounter beliefs all had 
negative relationships with well-being that mirrored the earlier relationships found (Table 20).  
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One exception to this was an interaction between Encounter beliefs and interpersonal stressors 
that predicted mental health.  At low levels of interpersonal stressors it was better for people to 
have fewer Encounter beliefs, but at high levels of interpersonal stressors Encounter beliefs were 
a strength (Figure 9). Soul-Building beliefs had a negative relationship with positive states of 
mind (b= -.07, p<.05), but no interaction effects as there were with the total number of life 
stressors.  Overcoming did not have any significant relationships with well-being. 
Question 3: Beliefs and subjective appraisals of stress and growth 
Beliefs and perceptions of stressors. Our third broad research question was whether 
participants beliefs’ related to how they responded to stressors including their perceptions of the 
stressor, reported coping efforts, and perceived growth. To begin, we turned to the question of 
whether beliefs about suffering were related to stress appraisals.  At Time 2, we asked 
participants to identify the most stressful event they had experienced since Time 1 and then rate 
both how stressful it was initially and how stressful it was at present (Table 21).  We also asked 
participants to identify how long the event had been happening in order to differentiate between 
acute and chronic stressors.  We analyzed the data to see if there were significant relationships 
between beliefs and reports of initial or current stress appraisals.  
In terms of initial stress appraisals, individuals with strong Random beliefs at Time 1 
were more likely to report higher initial stress appraisals (b=-.13, p=.03).  Although the 
relationship did not reach significance, individuals with stronger Suffering God beliefs also had a 
trend to significance in the same direction (b =.10, p=0.07)  When it came to predicting how 
people would rate their current experience of the stressor, none of the beliefs at Time 1 were 
significant but several beliefs from Time 2 were:  analyses of cross-sectional data from Time 2 
showed that people with stronger Suffering God beliefs rated their current experience as more 
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stressful than those lower Suffering God beliefs (b =.16, p= 0.01).  A trend emerged such that 
people with stronger Overcoming beliefs also reported experiencing more stress (b=.14, p=.05).  
Well-being at Time 2 was also predicted by some interactions between individuals’ 
beliefs and their reports of how stressful their intervening stressful event was currently. 
Participants who appraised the event as very stressful had higher stress levels if they also had 
strong Retribution beliefs (F(4,153) = 37.76,  p<.01; Figure 10). Similarly, participants reporting 
very stressful events had much lower PSOMS scores if they had strong Unorthodox beliefs 
(F(4,184) =37.04, p<.01; Figure 11).  In contrast, strong Encounter beliefs predicted resiliency 
when paired with higher stress appraisals; at low stress appraisal levels Encounter beliefs were 
associated with the lowest PSOMS scores, but as individuals appraised their events as 
increasingly stressful, Encounter beliefs were associated with better mental health (F(4,185)= 
35.73, p<.01; Figure 12).   
Coping strategies and perceptions of growth. Some specific styles of coping were also 
related to changes in VOSS scores. Regression analyses showed that increases in Divine 
Responsibility (b= -.10, p < .01) Providence (b=-.12, p <.05), and Overcoming beliefs (b=-.13, 
p<.05) all coincided with less positive religious coping as measured by the RCOPE.  There was 
also a trend such that increases in Suffering God beliefs were also associated with lower levels of 
positive religious coping (b=-.10, p<.05).  More generally, increases in Providence beliefs were 
related to lower levels of religious coping as measured by the Brief COPE (b=-.15, p<.05). 
Changes in VOSS beliefs were also associated with specific non-religious coping efforts. 
Lower levels of self-distraction were associated with increases in Random or Encounter beliefs 
(both b=-.10, p<.05).  Greater active coping was associated with increases in Divine 
Responsibility beliefs (b=.12, p<.05) and reductions in Suffering God beliefs (b=-.12, p<.05).  
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More reported use of denial as a coping strategy was related to decreases in Providence (b=-.11, 
p<.01) and Suffering God (b=-.12, p<.01) beliefs.  Increases in Overcoming beliefs were 
associated with more use of substances to cope with the stressor (b=.07, p<.01), and there was a 
trend such that decreases in Encounter  beliefs were associated with more venting (b=-.08, 
p=.05).  Finally, participants who reported decreases in Encounter beliefs were more likely to 
engage in self-blame (b=-.08, p<.05), whereas individuals whose Divine Responsibility beliefs 
increased were more likely to engage in accepting coping strategies (b=.13, p<.05). 
Beliefs also predicted perceptions of growth from stressful experiences.  Participants with 
stronger Random beliefs at Time 1 reported lower levels of perceived growth from their stressful 
experience (b=-.16; p<.05) at Time 2.   In contrast, higher reports of growth appeared among 
those with stronger Divine Responsibility (b=.30, p<.01), Providence (b=.24, p<.01), Encounter 
(b=.25; p<.01), Overcoming (b=.35, p<.01), Suffering God (b=.28, p<.01), and Soul-Building 
(b=.19, p<.01) beliefs at Time 1.  Finally, when changes in beliefs were reviewed, we found that 
reports of growth from stressors were negatively related to increases in Retribution (b=-.19, 
p<.05) and Providence (b=-.18, p<.05) beliefs.   
Study 2 Discussion 
Study 2 examined relationships between beliefs and well-being, looking at three broad 
questions.  First, are beliefs related to well-being?  We wondered if those relationships would be 
direct or mediated by other factors, and if an individual’s level of religiosity might influence 
those relationships.  Second, we hoped to discover if participants’ life experiences influence the 
way that their beliefs and well-being are connected?  Third, we wondered if beliefs influence the 
way that people perceive stressors and how they respond to them?   
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In response to our first question, beliefs did relate to well-being in a variety of ways, both 
cross-sectionally and over time, but not all of them were significant.  Using structural equation 
modeling, we found that some beliefs showed direct effects apart from optimism or negative 
attitudes towards God, others interacted with level of religiosity, and still others had total effects 
in which individual contributors could not be isolated.  An exhaustive discussion of each 
significant result would be both overwhelming given the quantity of results and unhelpful given 
the exploratory nature of this research, so in the interest of clarity we will focus this discussion 
on a few essential findings.  
First, this research suggests that some beliefs are indeed consistently related to poorer 
levels of well-being, others are related to better health, and three had only a few relationships to 
health at all.  Unorthodox, Retribution, Limited Knowledge, and Providence beliefs were all 
consistent predictors of higher depression, anxiety, and stress alongside lower levels of mental 
health and fewer positive states of mind.  Suffering God beliefs were almost always related to 
greater well-being, but there were some apparent contradictions to this in the longitudinal data 
where Suffering God beliefs predicted reduced well-being at Time 2.  Random, Overcoming, and 
Soul-Building beliefs were the least related to well-being, with only a few significant 
relationships across the whole study. 
In addition to discovering that beliefs are indeed related to well-being in many instances, 
we also found that the most common mechanism for that relationship was optimism.  Negative 
attitudes towards God were also a mediator of some effects, but to a much lesser extent. In terms 
of moderators, we found that the extent to which a person considers himself or herself religious 
will often have an impact on whether or not a belief relates to well-being.  In many cases, being 
very religious was an indirect protective factor (e.g., mitigating the effects of Unorthodox 
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beliefs), and other times it was an essential part of the belief’s positive relationship (e.g. 
Suffering God beliefs).  Many of the significant results included both indirect and total effects, 
the latter indicating that the relationships were too complex to be teased apart with these 
analyses.   
A third key finding related to the above findings is that, in general, beliefs are related to 
psychological rather than physical health.  This is somewhat surprising given the significant 
literature on relationships between religion and health, but it may be that there is an entirely 
different mechanism through which those other studies found the relationships between religion 
and health which operates apart from the cognitive content of beliefs.  Although a few 
relationships with physical health emerged out of the structural equation models, they were rare 
exceptions among the 120 models examined; the vast majority of findings related to measures of 
psychological distress.  
A fourth important finding is that, in general, our data supported previous research 
suggesting that beliefs for older adults are generally stable (e.g., (Hamberg, 1991), but with a few 
exceptions (e.g. Limited Knowledge).  Further research will be needed to determine whether the 
changes reported in this sample are a function of the beliefs themselves or if it is an issue related 
to measurement.  It should be noted that although the initial reliability data for the VOSS appears 
sound, it is still a new instrument and thus this unexpected finding may be a reflection of an 
unknown weakness of those particular subscales. Analyses did not confirm specific reasons 
behind the changes so we do not know the mechanisms or reasons behind the change, only that 
they are relatively rare.   
Fifth, and perhaps most important, this research suggests that the relationships between 
beliefs and well-being are nuanced and contextualized.  The interactions that appeared with the 
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various moderators (religiousness, total number of life stressors, interpersonal stressors) provided 
a glimpse into the possibility that given the right context some beliefs can be either a liability 
(e.g. Retribution beliefs paired with a high number of interpersonal stressors) and others may be 
a buffer against potential increases in distress (e.g. Soul-Building beliefs paired with a higher 
total number of life stressors).   
For our final research question, we explored the question of whether beliefs were related 
to how older adults responded to stressors, including stress appraisals and perceptions of post-
traumatic growth.  As with our previous two research questions, the answer is a resounding 
“Yes!”  Beliefs are indeed related to perceptions of stress and growth, often in surprising ways.    
Our findings regarding perceptions of stress included unexpected and expected results, 
following our previous analyses.  In terms of the surprises, Suffering God beliefs – which 
consistently predicted greater well-being cross-sectionally in our structural equation models – 
were associated with reports of higher perceptions of stress (along with Overcoming and Random 
beliefs, neither of which predicted much else in other analyses).  Other results were more 
expected, such as the association between Unorthodox and Retribution beliefs and perceptions of 
greater stress, a result consistent with our earlier findings regarding negative relationships 
between these beliefs and well-being measures. 
Interestingly, some of the coping strategies associated with increases or decreases in 
specific beliefs appear to have direct ties to some aspect of the theology associated with those 
beliefs. The higher levels of active coping corresponding to increases in Divine Responsibility 
beliefs could be a reflection of a theology in which humans expect to encounter suffering as a 
matter of course, and the lower reports of personal growth corresponding to increases in 
Retribution and Providence beliefs could be understood within the framework of two sets of 
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beliefs in which the role of the individual in each moment is secondary to other factors (e.g. 
karma, God’s control over details of life).  More research is required to see if these relationships 
are consistent –there are some results which do not appear to be connected to beliefs in a logical 
way – but they raise the possibility that these may be connections to be explored.   
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research 
This study has several strengths.  It is one of few longitudinal studies on religious beliefs, 
allowing us to run a range of sophisticated analyses incorporating both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal data.  The study’s religious measures are another strength as well, since they are 
both theologically coherent and attempt to access constructs that are clinically relevant.  The 
sample, while certainly not as large as some national studies, has more than adequate power and 
size for the statistical techniques used and the life experiences represented include a wide range 
of life stressors.   
This study also has several limitations.  First and most importantly, this is a narrow 
sample in terms of participant age, race, and geographical location. We will need many more 
studies from other samples of college students, young adults, middle-aged adults, and other older 
adult samples that vary by race and geographic location to determine if the relationships we 
found are generally consistent or specific to certain populations.  Second, although we were able 
to identify two mediators of the religious beliefs-well-being relationships it is very likely that 
there are other factors which we did not measure that may be equally important to understanding 
those relationships.    
Third, as an exploratory study these results should be considered with care.  Although 
some of the results were consistent  (e.g., Unorthodox beliefs were repeatedly positively related 
to depression, anxiety and stress) there is always the possibility, in spite of our conservative 
  60
statistical techniques, that some of the results are spurious.  Rather than being taken as having 
established the relationships between religious beliefs about suffering and well-being, these 
results should be taken as the start of what should become an ongoing line of research 
contributed to by many different scholars.  That some religious beliefs about suffering relate to 
well-being in powerful ways seems clear, but the details of those relationships remain to be 
confirmed and understood in a more substantial way.   
Much remains to be done with future research.  Although quantitative work is essential 
for statistical power and generalizability, at least initially some of this research should be 
qualitative to determine where the most fruitful lines of research will lie.  In particular, learning 
where people obtain or develop their beliefs, the factors that influence them, and how aware of 
and able to articulate their beliefs people are all important questions that should be addressed 
qualitatively.   
In addition, future research should consider what other factors may serve as mediators 
and moderators of these relationships and incorporate them into the study design.  Future 
research should consider the contributory roles of education and specific life experiences (not 
just number of total stressors or interpersonal stressors), and how religious communities may 
shape and maintain beliefs.  We also need more prospective studies that can examine whether 
changes in beliefs are connected to specific life events.  More work should also be done on 
teasing apart the differences between beliefs and attitudes towards God, to determine how much 
of the research on each topic may be applicable to others, to see whether they function 
differently or are in fact largely synonymous.  
This research raises far more questions than it answers.  Some of the results were 
unsurprising (e.g. Unorthodox beliefs’ consistently negative relationships with well-being, 
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reflecting as they do an inherently pessimistic view of the world and religion), while others were 
confusing, (e.g. why Suffering God beliefs were related to positive well-being in every cross-
sectional analyses, but associated with increased perceptions of stress and with greater distress 
longitudinally).   
One of the questions this research leaves us with is whether beliefs play a causal role in 
distress, are simply activated as an available resource during times of distress, or if they are 
created by the distress itself.  In other words, do beliefs contribute to changes in well-being, or 
are they a by-product?  For example, did increasing Encounter, Overcoming, and Soul-Building 
beliefs actually leave people more vulnerable to distress, or were they a marker of some other 
process?  Is it possible that some beliefs simply become more salient as a resource as people’s 
distress increases, or do they contribute to the distress itself?  In the case of “positive” beliefs 
like Suffering God beliefs, do they actually improve some individuals’ mental health, or are 
beliefs in a God that cares for and compassionately suffers simply reflective of a “healthier” 
perspective on the world, perhaps greater openness to spiritual resources?      
One puzzling finding was that most of the results found related to negative rather than 
positive relationships to mental health.  Although there were a some positive relationships (i.e. 
most of the Suffering God cross-sectional results), the most consistent findings were that 
Unorthodox, Retribution, Limited Knowledge, and Providence beliefs were related to poorer 
well-being.  We wondered whether this was a function of the fact that we happened to be 
measuring these specific beliefs, whether it was related to our choice of well-being measures that 
were simply more sensitive to distress, whether it is a function of our admittedly narrow sample 
of senior citizens in New England, or whether this was a reflection of some broader truth 
regarding religious beliefs being bad for people.   
  62
General Discussion 
Together, these studies add substantially to the literature on religious beliefs about 
suffering and well-being, confirming not only that we can measure beliefs about suffering but 
that it is important to do so.  In Study 1 we found that the VOSS retained its strong 
psychometrics in a large multi-religious American sample.  The factor structure replicated that 
found in previous research and it demonstrated excellent reliability and validity, including 
expected relationships to related religious constructs.  This data replicated the measure’s initial 
findings in a university student sample, suggesting that the VOSS has utility as a measure of 
religious beliefs in broader samples as well.  
One result of note from Study 1 is that although the VOSS showed that beliefs differed 
among broad religious traditions (e.g. Atheists vs. Catholics), based on this research it appears 
that denomination is not a valid proxy for beliefs, or at least not beliefs about suffering.  This 
data suggests that researchers should not make assumptions about the content of beliefs based on 
denominational affiliation.  Just because an individual is Presbyterian does not mean that he or 
she endorses Calvinistic beliefs regarding providence, just as being a Pentecostal does not imply 
belief in a “health and wealth gospel.”    
In Study 2, we found a large number of very complex relationships between beliefs about 
suffering and well-being.  Beliefs’ relationships to well-being were often moderated by an 
individual’s level of religiousness or by how many stressful events they had.  These relationships 
were often mediated by optimism, negative attitudes towards God, or both.  Beliefs about 
suffering were also closely tied to how people responded to stressors, both their perceptions of 
stress and growth, and their perceived coping responses.  Most often beliefs predicted decreases 
of psychological, not physical well-being.   
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Although the results of both these studies represent an important contribution to the 
literature, more than anything they point towards the research that remains to be done.  Although 
the VOSS appears to function well in an American sample we do not know if it would be as 
strong psychometrically in other international settings.  Indeed, it seems likely that the 
Retribution subscale in particular would need to be adjusted to incorporate more nuanced views 
of retribution beliefs found in Asia, just as the current version of the VOSS was designed to 
access nuances within Christianity in a North American setting.  Hindus in India and Buddhists 
in Thailand almost certainly have a different religious framework than many self-identified 
Hindus and Buddhists in the United States, so there may need to be subscales within the VOSS 
that are dropped or new ones developed for research in other samples.   
Additionally, much more work remains to elucidate our understanding of how beliefs 
interact with well-being.  The relationships found in our narrow sample of senior citizens in New 
England must not be assumed to be the same as those that might be present among college 
students on the West Coast, patients with cancer or chronic illnesses, veterans, minorities 
struggling against racism, or farmers in the Midwest. We now have an initial framework in 
which to develop hypotheses, but the work of confirming them and developing better, more 
accurate theories remains.   
 Finally, these studies point towards need for research on the clinical implications 
of specific beliefs about suffering. Much has been written regarding the integration of spirituality 
into therapy, but it remains to be seen whether or not religious beliefs about suffering are indeed 
a construct with clinical utility, and what that might look like.  Determining this will require 
coordination of clinicians and scholars. Far from being the last word on religious beliefs about 
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suffering, these are two of the first of what will hopefully be many studies researching beliefs 
and well-being. 
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Table 1.  VOSS subscale origins and sample items 
 
Subscale  This belief describes 
participants who…  
Scale Items  
Unorthodox … believe in God/a higher 
power, but not divine 
omnipotence or  
omnibenevolence 
 God could prevent evil and/or suffering from happening, but God 
chooses not to because God isn’t entirely good.  
 God allows suffering because God is not all-loving.  
 We know that God is not all-good because there is suffering in the 
world.  
Random ... think suffering happens 
randomly, without divine 
involvement or human control 
 No one knows why bad things happen to good people; it’s all pretty 
random.  
 Suffering happens randomly, not because of anything people have done 
wrong.  
 Suffering just happens without purpose or underlying reason.  
Retribution … think individuals get what 
they deserve, believe in karma 
 Individuals suffer because of their deeds in the past.  
 Karma is the best explanation for individuals’ suffering.  
 Individuals experience suffering as a result of their past wrongdoing.  
Divine 
Responsibility 
… ascribe to Augustinian 
theology or Islamic perspective 
in which suffering is a reflection 
of human sin vs. God’s power or 
goodness 
 God is all-powerful and can change situations to alleviate suffering.  
 When we suffer, God does God’s best within chosen boundaries.  
 God is all-good and all-powerful, but God is not obligated to relieve 
suffering.  
Limited 
Knowledge 
… ascribe to an Open Theist 
theology in which God is seen 
as good and omnipotent but 
chooses to limit knowledge 
about the future 
 The main obstacle to God preventing suffering is that God doesn’t 
know when it will happen.  
 God cares about people who are suffering, but can’t protect them 
because God doesn’t know in advance  what will happen.  
 The main impediment to God protecting people from suffering is that 
God doesn’t know when or how it  will happen.  
Providence … believe that God exerts 
control and plans for every 
detail of individuals’ lives.  
 Everything that we experience – including suffering – is planned in 
detail by God.  
 We shouldn’t resist suffering because God has planned every detail of 
our experiences – even the bad ones.  
 There’s no need to strive against suffering because God will ultimately 
control everything we experience.  
Overcoming … ascribe to a “Health & 
Wealth” or “Prosperity Gospel” 
in which obedience to God 
always results in success, 
prosperity, and freedom from 
suffering 
 By praying and having faith we can take control over suffering.  
 God will stop our suffering if we pray and have faith.  
 People can stop or get out of their experiences of suffering by praying.  
Encounter … believe that the process of 
dealing with suffering is more 
important than the reason for it 
 The most important thing when we experience hard things is to keep 
asking God questions, even if we don’t understand the answers.  
 The most important thing to remember about human suffering is that 
God is above and beyond it all; we might never get answers to our 
questions.  
 Suffering is a way to encounter a God who is above and beyond human 
experience and comprehension.  
Suffering God …believe that God is both good 
and suffers with people 
 When we suffer, God is suffering along with us.  
 We know God is good in the midst of pain because God suffers with 
us.  
 God’s primary role when we encounter suffering is to experience it 
with us.  
Soul-Building …believe that suffering is a way 
to build human character and 
become spiritually stronger 
 Suffering is intended by God to be a source of personal growth.  
 We suffer because God wants us to become a better people through 
experiencing hard things.  
 God intends suffering to be a catalyst for growth.  
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Table 2.  Study 1 Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables by World Religions  
 
 Atheist/ 
Agnostic 
N= 111 
Jewish 
N = 85 
Muslim 
N = 95 
Hindu 
N = 95 
Buddhist 
N = 98 
Catholic 
N = 226 
Protestant 
N = 259 
Gender % Male 48 55 67 60 57 48 34 
Female 52 45 33 40 43 52 66 
Age % 18-24 28 27 36 39 38 29 19 
25-34 40 40 49 41 37 36 34 
35-44 14 16 8 14 11 14 21 
45-54 12 6 6 2 10 13 15 
55-64 6 7 0 2 2 7 10 
64+ 0 2 0 1 2 0 1 
Ethnic/Racial 
% 
American 
Indian/ 
Alaska Native 
1 4 3 12 2 2 0 
Asian 7 4 27 39 32 5 4 
Black/African 
American 
5 1 11 2 0 6 12 
Hispanic or 
Latino 
7 2 2 1 3 9 3 
Native 
Hawaiian/ 
Pacific Islander 
0 6 1 0 0 1 1 
White non-
Hispanic 
77 72 38 28 58 75 78 
Biracial/ Other 3 12 18 18 5 2 2 
Geographic 
Region % 
South 29 25 40 28 32 33 45 
Midwest 20 8 23 17 17 16 24 
Northeast 19 31 19 27 18 31 12 
West Coast 24 20 14 24 24 16 14 
Southwest 8 16 5 3 8 4 5 
Income % $10k or less 8 4 7 5 12 4 7 
$10,001 - $20k 15 8 12 4 10 9 9 
$20,001 - $30k 27 14 15 18 18 14 17 
$40,001 - $50k 15 13 16 19 13 23 21 
$50,000 -$70k 14 21 20 25 25 17 16 
$70,001 - $100k 11 20 16 16 13 15 20 
$100,000 < 10 20 15 12 8 17 10 
Education % Some High 
School 
3 1 4 0 2 1 2 
High School 
Degree 
5 5 15 9 3 9 15 
Some College 50 28 27 21 38 36 32 
College Degree 37 38 34 39 38 39 35 
Graduate Degree 5 28 20 31 20 15 17 
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Table 3.  Study 1 Descriptive Statistics of Religious Variables by World Religions  
 
 
 Atheist/ 
Agnostic 
N=111 
Jewish 
N=85 
Muslim 
N=95 
Hindu 
N=95 
Buddhist 
N=98 
Catholic 
N=226 
Protestant 
N=259 
Religious 
Self-
Ranking % 
Not at all 89 21 5 5 13 9 8 
Slightly  9 40 17 31 39 35 25 
Moderately  2 19 47 45 40 42 48 
Very  0 20 31 19 8 14 19 
Spiritual 
Self-
Ranking % 
Not at all 45 11 3 1 3 4 1 
Slightly  31 33 16 21 14 26 17 
Moderately  12 33 44 40 46 41 38 
Very  13 24 38 38 37 28 44 
Belief 
about God 
% 
I don't believe in a 
personal God or in a 
higher power 42 11 0 1 14 0 0 
I don't know if there 
is a personal God or a 
higher power of some 
kind, and I don't know 
if I ever will 28 13 2 3 15 9 2 
I don't know if there 
is a personal God, but 
I do believe in a 
higher power of some 
kind 17 27 11 27 43 14 9 
Although I sometimes 
question His 
existence, I do believe 
in God and believe 
He knows of me as a 
person 8 12 20 19 10 34 26 
I am sure God really 
exists and that He is 
active in my life. 5 38 67 49 17 42 63 
 
 
  
Table 4. Study 1 Descriptive Statistics for All VOSS Subscales  
 
 Mean± (S.D.) Response Range S.E. Cronbach’s 
α  
Unorthodox  6.01 ±  (3.65) 3-18 0.12 .83 
Random 10.53 ±  (4.03) 3-18 0.13 .81 
Retribution 9.14 ±  (4.04) 3-18 0.13 .82 
Divine Responsibility  11 ±  (4.07) 3-18 0.13 .72 
Limited Knowledge 6.25 ±  (3.58) 3-18 0.11 .85 
Encounter 11.11 ±  (4.11) 3-18 0.13 .73 
Providence 9.43 ±  (4.53) 3-18 0.14 .87 
Overcoming  9.83 ±  (4.28) 3-18 0.14 .87 
Suffering God 10.44 ±  (4.77) 3-18 0.15 .90 
Soul-Building 11.27±  (4.51) 3-18 0.14 .91 
Note. S.D. = Standard Deviation, S.E. = Standard Error;  
 
  
Table 5. Study 1 VOSS Means by World Religion 
 
 Religion Mean S.D. 
Unorthodox Atheist/Agnostic 6.33 4.146 
Jewish 6.72 3.909 
Muslim 6.25 3.422 
Hindu 7.23 3.533 
Buddhist 6.93 3.846 
Catholic 5.78 3.624 
Protestant 4.69 2.701 
Random Atheist/Agnostic 13.78 3.726 
Jewish 11.66 4.003 
Muslim 9.16 3.870 
Hindu 9.63 3.509 
Buddhist 10.01 3.794 
Catholic 10.45 3.899 
Protestant 9.92 3.849 
Retribution Atheist/Agnostic 7.80 4.025 
Jewish 8.70 3.874 
Muslim 9.42 3.741 
Hindu 12.72 3.458 
Buddhist 12.14 3.866 
Catholic 8.18 3.342 
Protestant 7.97 3.619 
Divine 
Responsibility 
Atheist/Agnostic 6.08 3.802 
Jewish 9.99 4.570 
Muslim 12.21 3.139 
Hindu 12.02 3.198 
Buddhist 8.28 4.081 
Catholic 11.70 3.364 
Protestant 12.87 2.963 
Limited 
Knowledge 
Atheist/Agnostic 4.87 2.876 
Jewish 6.56 3.637 
Muslim 6.69 3.363 
Hindu 8.25 3.897 
Buddhist 6.75 3.776 
Catholic 6.23 3.498 
Protestant 5.62 3.425 
 
 Religion Mean S.D. 
Encounter Atheist/Agnostic 6.28 3.814 
Jewish 10.30 4.226 
Muslim 12.31 3.466 
Hindu 12.21 3.372 
Buddhist 8.94 4.230 
Catholic 12.07 3.584 
Protestant 12.55 3.033 
Providence Atheist/Agnostic 4.99 3.136 
Jewish 8.22 4.768 
Muslim 11.30 4.524 
Hindu 10.79 3.927 
Buddhist 7.35 4.010 
Catholic 10.02 4.077 
Protestant 10.65 4.316 
Overcoming Atheist/Agnostic 5.11 3.318 
Jewish 8.71 4.605 
Muslim 11.81 4.005 
Hindu 11.60 3.810 
Buddhist 8.15 3.895 
Catholic 10.29 3.700 
Protestant 10.97 3.738 
Suffering God Atheist/Agnostic 5.22 3.464 
Jewish 8.61 4.918 
Muslim 11.08 4.739 
Hindu 11.69 4.055 
Buddhist 7.93 4.347 
Catholic 11.45 4.227 
Protestant 12.63 3.853 
Soul-Building Atheist/Agnostic 6.50 4.286 
Jewish 10.25 5.105 
Muslim 12.36 4.004 
Hindu 12.31 3.587 
Buddhist 9.54 4.835 
Catholic 12.17 3.835 
Protestant 12.71 3.622 
  
Table 6.  Study 1 Correlations between individual VOSS subscales  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Unorthodox 1          
2. Random .21** 1         
3. Retribution .16** -.23** 1        
4. Divine Responsibility -.17** -.34** .08** 1       
5. Limited Knowledge .39** .16** .17** .13** 1      
6. Encounter -.07* -.24** .08* .71** .21** 1     
7. Providence -.09** -.34** .13** .66** .09** .63** 1    
8. Overcoming -.16** -.35** .22** .63** .12** .61** .61** 1   
9. Suffering God -.22** -.24** .03 .70** .17** .67** .59** .62** 1  
10. Soul-Building -.13** -.37** .18** .68** .14** .73** .73** .64** .65** 1 
Note. *Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the p<.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
 
  
Table 7. Correlations between individual VOSS subscales and validation measures  
 
  Christian 
Orthodoxy 
GIS 
Benevolent 
GIS 
Providence  
GIS 
Challenge  
WAS 
Justice 
WAS 
Randomness 
WAS 
Luck 
WAS Self-
Controllability 
Unorthodox -.34** -.47** -.30** -.38** .04 .27** .07* -.11** 
Random -.32** -.20** -.43** -.36** -.13** .68** .10** .10** 
Retribution -.13** -.08* -.01 -.01 .44** -.10** .10** .00 
Divine 
Responsibility 
.68** .46** .61** .63** .15** -.32** .05 .11** 
Limited 
Knowledge 
-.03 -.15** -.06 -.08* .16** .23** .10** -.04 
Encounter .59** .44** .54** .63** .13** -.25** .09** .12** 
Providence .53** .28** .66** .50** .20** -.35** .02 .06 
Overcoming .54** .35** .63** .52** .31** -.36** .09** .08** 
Suffering God .65** .53** .63** .65** .11** -.28** .06 .07* 
Soul Building .56** .46** .58** .67** .20** -.34** .05 .08** 
Note. *Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the p<.01 level (2-tailed).  Christian Orthodoxy = Christian 
Orthodoxy Scale (Short Form); GIS = God Image Scales; WAS = World Assumptions Scale;  
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Figure 1.  Study 1 Religious Denominational Groupings  
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Protestant 
Theology & 
Experience
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Evangelical Free 
Church
Conservative 
Congregational 
Christian 
Conference
Christian 
Missionary 
Alliance
Bible Church
Charismatic 
Protestant 
Theology & 
Experience
Assemblies of 
God
Pentecostal
Full Gospel 
Fellowship
Foursquare 
Gospel
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Brethren
Hutterites
AME/Black 
Church
African 
Methodist 
Episcopal
Black Church
Other
Lutheran
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Table 8.  Study 2 Descriptive Statistics of Religious Variables by World Religions 
 
 
 
Atheist/ 
Agnostic 
5.5% 
(N=17) 
Jewish 
4.2% 
(N=13) 
Hindu 
.3% 
(N=1) 
Buddhist 
1% (N=3) 
Catholic 
44.3% 
(N=136) 
Protestant 
28.7% 
(N=88) 
Other 
10.7% 
(N=33) 
Religious 
Self-Ranking at 
Time 1 
Not 70.6% (N=12) 
15.4% 
(N=2) --- 
66.7% 
(N=2) 1.5% (N=2) 3.5% (N=3) 
6.1% 
(N=2) 
Slightly 17.6% (N=3) 
30.8% 
(N=4) --- --- 
8.9% 
(N=12) 
18.6% 
(N=16) 
15.2% 
(N=5) 
Moderately 5.9% (N=1) 
53.8% 
(N=7) 
100% 
(N=1) 
33.3% 
(N=1) 
51.9% 
(N=70) 
46.5% 
(N=40) 
57.6% 
(N=19) 
Very 5.9% (N=1) --- --- --- 
37.8% 
(N=51) 
31.4% 
(N=27) 
21.2% 
(N=7) 
 
Spiritual 
Self-Ranking at 
Time 1 
Not 29.4% (N=5) --- --- --- 1.5% (N=2) 10% (N=5) --- 
Slightly 29.4% (N=5) 
25% 
(N=3) 
100% 
(N=1) --- 
18.5% 
(N=24) 20% (N=16) 
10% 
(N=2) 
Moderately 23.5% (N=4) 
66.7% 
(N=8) --- 
66.7% 
(N=2) 
40% 
(N=52) 
35.6% 
(N=31) 
40% 
(N=14) 
Very 17.6% (N=3) 
8.3% 
(N=1) --- 
33.3% 
(N=1) 
40% 
(N=52) 
40.2% 
(N=35) 
50% 
(N=16) 
Belief 
in God 
at Time 1 
I don't believe in a personal God or in a 
higher power. 
29.4% 
(N=5) --- --- --- 0.8% (N=1) 1.2% (N=1) --- 
I don't know if there is a personal God or a 
higher power of some kind, and I do 
23.5% 
(N=4) 
7.7% 
(N=1) --- --- 1.6% (N=2) 3.6% (N=3) 
3.1% 
(N=1) 
I don't know if there is a personal God, but I 
do believe in a higher power of s 
29.4% 
(N=5) 
46.2% 
(N=6) --- 
100% 
(N=3) 6.3% (N=8) 
22.6% 
(N=19) 
18.8% 
(N=6) 
Although I sometimes question His 
existence, I do believe in God and believe 
He 
--- 
15.4% 
(N=2) --- --- 
22% 
(N=28) 25% (N=21) 
21.9% 
(N=7) 
I am sure God exists and that He is active in 
my life. 
17.6% 
(N=3) 
30.8% 
(N=4) --- --- 
69.3% 
(N=88) 
47.6% 
(N=40) 
56.2% 
(N=18) 
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Table 9.  Study 2 VOSS Means Grouped by Gender 
 
  Male 
M (SD) 
Female 
M (SD) 
Combined 
M (SD) 
 Unorthodox * 2.14 (1.36) 1.69 (1.11) 1.81(1.19) 
 Random  3.93(1.46) 4.16(1.38) 4.10(1.40) 
 Retribution  2.48(1.41) 2.28(1.33) 2.35(1.37) 
 Divine Response  3.45(1.30) 3.76(1.36) 3.70(1.35) 
 Limited Knowledge  2.54(1.31) 2.31(1.35) 2.38(1.35) 
 Encounter * 3.43(1.21) 3.77(1.27) 3.69(1.28) 
 Providence  2.53(1.30) 2.84(1.58) 2.79(1.54) 
 Overcoming  3.25(1.44) 3.58(1.35) 3.50(1.38) 
 Suffering God ** 3.35(1.57) 4.00(1.59) 3.85(1.61) 
 Soul Building  2.94(1.49) 2.93(1.43) 2.94(1.45) 
Note. *Difference is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed).  
**Difference is significant at the p<.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 10. Study 2 Correlations between individual VOSS subscales  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Unorthodox 1          
2. Random .10 1         
3. Retribution .30** -.11 1        
4. Divine Responsibility .01 .04 .16** 1       
5. Limited Knowledge .42** .20** .33** .12* 1      
6. Encounter .09 .09 .11 .51** .21** 1     
7. Providence .20** -.10 .27** .53** .12* .37** 1    
8. Overcoming -.03 -.09 .14* .48** .12* .43** .34** 1   
9. Suffering God -.01 -.10 .09 .56** .12* .44** .45** .50** 1  
10. Soul-Building .17** -.14* .39** .53** .23** .41** .62** .42** .44** 1 
Note. *Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the p<.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 11.  Reports of stressful events between Times 1 & 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Stressor  % (N) 
Dealing with Change 5% (N=10) 
Death/Loss 8% (N=18) 
Financial Concerns 5% (N=10) 
Health Concerns 19% (N=42) 
Health Concerns of Friends/Family 9% (N=21) 
Logistics of daily living/traveling 14% (N=32) 
Relational concerns 17% (N=38) 
World events 1% (N=2) 
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Table 12. Time 1 Life Stressors Checklist-Revised (LSC-R) responses by gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Note: Data collection error may have influenced the number of positive responses for items appearing after this item on the questionnaire
 
Male (N=76)  Female (N=229) Total (N=307) 
Been in serious disaster 28 69 97 
Seen serious accident 41 81 122 
Been in serious accident 29 65 94 
Close family member sent to jail 14 57 71 
Self sent to jail 7 4 11 
Put in foster care or up for adoption 4 6 10 
Parents separate/divorce while living with them 8 29 37 
Self separated or divorced 25 72 97 
Serious money problems 17 39 56 
Serious physical or mental illness 29 69 98 
Emotionally abused or neglected 9 42 51 
Physically neglected 1 12 13 
Abortion or miscarriage* 0 56 56 
Separated from child against will 3 9 12 
Child with severe physical or mental handicap 6 23 29 
Caretaker for person with severe physical/mental handicap 12 97 109 
Death of someone close to you (sudden) 21 124 145 
Death of someone close to you (expected) 34 192 226 
Saw domestic violence before age 16 9 42 51 
Saw robbery, mugging or attack 5 26 31 
Self robbed, mugged or physically attacked 9 38 47 
Physical abuse before age 16 4 27 31 
Physical abuse after age 16 3 32 35 
Sexual harassment at work or school 2 39 41 
Sexual abuse before age 16 3 18 21 
Sexual abuse after age 16 0 16 16 
Rape before age 16 2 7 9 
Rape after age 16 0 13 13 
Saw one of these events happen to another person 7 54 61 
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Table 13.  Study 2 correlations between possible mediators and well-being  
 
  Depression Anxiety Stress SF-12 Physical SF-12 Mental PSOMS 
 Belief in God  -.11 .01 -.10 .06 .14 .05 
 Self-Ranked Religiousness  
-.00 .08 -.01 -.05 .04 -.05 
 Self-Ranked Spirituality 
-.04 .06 .05 -.06 .04 .04 
 Positive Attitudes Toward God  
-.18 -.09 -.12 -.09 .17 .17 
 Negative Attitudes Toward God  
.26** .18 .27** -.01 -.27* -.23** 
 Optimism  
-.38* -.31** -.39* .12 .22 .37* 
 
Note. *Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the p<.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 14. Study 2 Correlations between VOSS subscales and Well-Being Measures at Time 1 
 
  Depression Anxiety Stress SF-12 Physical SF-12 Mental PSOMS 
 Unorthodox  .21** .15* .24** -.03 -.13* -.20** 
 Random  
.08 .00 .05 .06 -.01 -.02 
 Retribution  
.13* .13* .13* -.07 -.11 -.06 
 Divine Response  
-.04 -.01 -.02 -.07 .11 -.02 
 Limited Knowledge  
.13* .04 .12 .05 -.09 -.07 
 Encounter  
.03 -.01 .07 -.04 .01 -.06 
 Providence  
.11 .07 .10 -.05 -.02 -.14* 
 Overcoming  
-.08 .01 -.04 -.00 .10 -.04 
 Suffering God  
-.03 .04 .05 -.05 .15* .01 
 Soul Building  
-.01 .04 .03 .01 .05 -.11 
 
Note. *Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the p<.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure 2. Study 2 Moderated Mediation Model with Religion as moderator 
 
VOSS Well-Being 
Negative 
Attitudes 
Towards God 
Religiousness 
Optimism 
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Table 15. Effects of Unorthodox Beliefs on Well-Being, Moderated by Religious Self-Ranking 
Outcome Type of Effect Mediator Moderator Level b Bootstrap S.E. P-value CI (L) CI (H) 
Depression Indirect Optimism Low 0.62 0.24 0.01 0.23 1.18 
Depression Indirect Optimism Medium 0.53 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.93 
Depression Indirect Optimism High 0.43 0.19 0.02 0.10 0.86 
Depression Total Low 1.03 0.34 0.00 0.47 1.86 
Depression Total Medium 0.81 0.25 0.00 0.42 1.42 
Depression Total High 0.59 0.27 0.03 0.13 1.17 
Anxiety Indirect Optimism Low 0.50 0.19 0.01 0.20 0.95 
Anxiety Indirect Optimism Medium 0.40 0.14 0.00 0.19 0.74 
Anxiety Indirect Optimism High 0.31 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.68 
Anxiety Total Low 0.82 0.29 0.00 0.36 1.53 
Anxiety Total Medium 0.62 0.21 0.00 0.30 1.18 
Stress Indirect Optimism Low 0.76 0.27 0.01 0.32 1.41 
Stress Indirect Optimism Medium 0.64 0.19 0.00 0.32 1.11 
Stress Indirect Optimism High 0.52 0.22 0.02 0.13 1.00 
Stress Total Low 1.29 0.39 0.00 0.62 2.15 
Stress Total Medium 1.01 0.30 0.00 0.51 1.67 
Stress Total High 0.73 0.32 0.03 0.15 1.41 
MCS12 Indirect ATGS Low -0.63 0.30 0.04 -1.40 -0.16 
MCS12 Indirect ATGS Medium -0.48 0.19 0.01 -1.01 -0.21 
MCS12 Total Low -1.01 0.36 0.01 -1.82 -0.39 
MCS12 Total Medium -0.78 0.25 0.00 -1.39 -0.38 
PSOMS Indirect Optimism Low -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.11 -0.02 
PSOMS Indirect Optimism Medium -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 
PSOMS Indirect Optimism High -0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 
PSOMS Total Low -0.10 0.03 0.00 -0.17 -0.05 
PSOMS Total Medium -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.13 -0.04 
PSOMS Total High -0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.02 
Notes: S.E. = Standard errors; CI (L) = Bias-corrected confidence interval (Low); CI (H) = Bias-corrected 
confidence interval (High); MCS12=Mental Health; PCS12 = Physical Health; ATGS= Negative Attitudes Towards 
God; PSOMS= Positive States of Mind Scale. 
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Table 16. Effects of Beliefs on Well-Being, Moderated by Religious Self-Ranking 
 
Belief Outcome Type of Effect Mediator Level b Bootstrap S.E. P-value CI (L) CI (H) 
Retribution PSOMS Total Medium -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 
Divine Responsibility PCS12 Direct -3.27 1.42 0.02 -6.05 -0.48 
Divine Responsibility PCS12 Interaction 0.98 0.45 0.03 0.10 1.86 
Divine Responsibility MCS12 Direct 2.69 1.18 0.02 0.38 5.01 
Limited Knowledge Depression Total Medium 0.40 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.78 
Limited Knowledge Stress Total Medium 0.50 0.20 0.01 0.16 0.97 
Limited Knowledge PCS12 Direct 1.23 0.57 0.03 0.12 2.34 
Providence Depression Total Medium 0.31 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.66 
Providence Stress Total Medium 0.41 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.79 
Providence MCS12 Total Medium -0.34 0.14 0.01 -0.66 -0.12 
Providence PSOMS Total Medium -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 
Overcoming MCS12 Direct 2.53 1.24 0.04 0.09 4.97 
Suffering God Stress Indirect Optimism High -0.46 0.19 0.02 -0.91 -0.14 
Suffering God Stress Total High -0.52 0.22 0.02 -1.02 -0.13 
Suffering God MCS12 Direct 2.92 1.08 0.01 0.80 5.05 
Suffering God PSOMS Indirect Optimism High 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 
Suffering God PSOMS Total 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 
 
Notes: S.E. = Standard errors; CI (L) = Bias-corrected confidence interval (Low); CI (H) = Bias-corrected confidence interval (High); MCS12=Mental Health; 
PCS12 = Physical Health; ATGS= Negative Attitudes Towards God; PSOMS= Positive States of Mind Scale. 
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Figure 3.  Divine Responsibility & Religious Self-Ranking Predict Physical Health 
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Figure 4.  Limited Knowledge & Religious Self-Ranking Predict Physical Health 
 
 
 
  
  96
Figure 5.  Sample Cross-Lag Model  
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Figure 6. Study 2 Moderated Mediation Model 
 
VOSS Well-Being 
Negative 
Attitudes 
Towards God 
# of Life 
Stressors 
Optimism 
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Table 17. Unorthodox Effects on Well-Being, Moderated by Total # of Life Stressors 
 
Outcome Type of Effect Mediator Moderator Level b Bootstrap S.E. P-value CI (L) CI (H) 
Depression Indirect Optimism Low 0.55 0.21 0.01 0.21 1.05 
Depression Indirect Optimism Medium 0.50 0.16 0.00 0.88 0.24 
Depression Indirect Optimism High 0.44 0.19 0.02 0.12 0.90 
Depression Total Low 0.82 0.28 0.00 0.35 1.47 
Depression Total Medium 0.77 0.23 0.00 0.39 1.32 
Depression Total High 0.72 0.31 0.02 0.21 1.50 
Anxiety Indirect Optimism Low 0.49 0.18 0.01 0.20 0.95 
Anxiety Indirect Optimism Medium 0.42 0.14 0.00 0.21 0.78 
Anxiety Indirect Optimism High 0.36 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.76 
Anxiety Total Low 0.64 0.25 0.01 0.25 1.25 
Anxiety Total Medium 0.57 0.20 0.00 0.25 1.04 
Anxiety Total High 0.50 0.24 0.04 0.14 1.13 
Stress Indirect Optimism Low 0.73 0.28 0.01 0.29 1.40 
Stress Indirect Optimism Medium 0.64 0.20 0.00 0.31 1.13 
Stress Indirect Optimism High 0.56 0.22 0.01 0.17 1.06 
Stress Total Low 1.09 0.39 0.01 0.45 1.99 
Stress Total Medium 1.00 0.31 0.00 0.46 1.67 
Stress Total High 0.91 0.38 0.02 0.28 1.81 
PCS12 Indirect Optimism Medium -0.41 0.20 0.04 -0.94 -0.10 
MCS12 Indirect ATGS Low -0.47 0.23 0.04 -1.06 -0.12 
MCS12 Indirect ATGS Medium -0.49 0.21 0.02 -1.07 -0.18 
MCS12 Total Low -0.87 0.31 0.01 -1.61 -0.36 
MCS12 Total Medium -0.83 0.27 0.00 -1.51 -0.41 
PSOMS Direct -0.16 0.06 0.01 -0.28 -0.04 
PSOMS Indirect Optimism Low -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 
PSOMS Indirect Optimism Medium -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 
PSOMS Indirect Optimism High -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 
PSOMS Total Low -0.08 0.03 0.00 -0.15 -0.04 
PSOMS Total Medium -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.13 -0.04 
PSOMS Total High -0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.14 -0.02 
 
Notes: S.E. = Standard errors; CI (L) = Bias-corrected confidence interval (Low); CI (H) = Bias-corrected 
confidence interval (High); MCS12=Mental Health; PCS12 = Physical Health; ATGS= Negative Attitudes Towards 
God; PSOMS= Positive States of Mind Scale. 
  99
Table 18. Effects of Beliefs on Well-Being, Moderated by Total # of Life Stressors 
Belief Outcome Type of Effect Mediator Level b Bootstrap S.E. P-value CI (L) CI (H) 
Retribution Depression Indirect Optimism Low 0.37 0.15 0.02 0.11 0.74 
Retribution Depression Total Low 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.26 1.07 
Retribution Anxiety Indirect Optimism Low 0.28 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.61 
Retribution Anxiety Indirect Optimism Medium 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.42 
Retribution Anxiety Total Low 0.37 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.74 
Retribution Anxiety Total Medium 0.24 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.52 
Retribution Stress Indirect Optimism Low 0.37 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.78 
Retribution Stress Indirect Optimism Medium 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.53 
Retribution Stress Total Low 0.56 0.23 0.02 0.14 1.06 
Retribution Stress Total Medium 0.37 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.74 
Retribution MCS12 Total Low -0.42 0.19 0.03 -0.84 -0.10 
Retribution PSOMS Indirect Optimism Low -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 
Retribution PSOMS Indirect Optimism Medium -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.00 
Retribution PSOMS Total Low -0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 
Retribution PSOMS Total Medium -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 
Divine Responsibility Depression Indirect Optimism High -0.37 0.19 0.05 -0.83 -0.08 
Divine Responsibility Depression Total High -0.56 0.26 0.03 -1.16 -0.13 
Divine Responsibility Anxiety Total High -0.39 0.18 0.03 -0.80 -0.08 
Limited Knowledge Depression Total Low 0.47 0.22 0.03 0.10 0.96 
Limited Knowledge Depression Total Medium 0.36 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.72 
Limited Knowledge Stress Indirect Low 0.31 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.72 
Limited Knowledge Stress Total Medium 0.45 0.20 0.03 0.10 0.90 
Encounter PCS12 Direct -1.98 0.90 0.03 -3.74 -0.22 
Providence Depression Total Low 0.44 0.19 0.02 0.12 0.87 
Providence Stress Total Low 0.46 0.23 0.04 0.05 0.92 
Providence MCS12 Indirect ATGS Low -0.26 0.13 0.04 -0.57 -0.07 
Providence MCS12 Total ATGS Low -0.46 0.18 0.01 -0.87 -0.15 
Suffering God Stress Indirect Optimism Medium -0.27 0.13 0.04 -0.55 -0.05 
Suffering God PSOMS Indirect Optimism Medium 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 
Soul-Building PSOMS Direct -0.14 0.04 0.00 -0.22 -0.05 
Soul-Building PSOMS Interaction 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 
 
Notes: S.E. = Standard errors; CI (L) = Bias-corrected confidence interval (Low); CI (H) = Bias-corrected 
confidence interval (High); MCS12=Mental Health; PCS12 = Physical Health; ATGS= Negative Attitudes Towards 
God; PSOMS= Positive States of Mind Scale.
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Figure 7.  Soul-Building Beliefs & Total Life Stressors Predict Positive States of Mind 
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Table 19. Unorthodox Effects on Well-Being, Moderated by Interpersonal Life Stressors 
 
Outcome Type of Effect Mediator Moderator Level b Bootstrap S.E. P-value CI (L) CI (H) 
Depression Indirect Optimism Medium 0.50 0.15 0.00 0.25 0.86 
Depression Indirect Optimism High 0.65 0.18 0.00 0.34 1.06 
Depression Total Medium 0.78 0.22 0.00 0.42 1.32 
Depression Total High 1.07 0.33 0.00 0.54 1.91 
Anxiety Indirect Optimism Medium 0.43 0.13 0.00 0.22 0.77 
Anxiety Indirect Optimism High 0.52 0.17 0.00 0.25 0.94 
Anxiety Total Medium 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.27 1.09 
Anxiety Total High 0.78 0.29 0.01 0.33 1.53 
Stress Direct 0.97 0.47 0.04 0.05 1.90 
Stress Indirect Optimism Medium 0.64 0.19 0.00 0.33 1.10 
Stress Indirect Optimism High 0.76 0.22 0.00 0.39 1.28 
Stress Total Medium 1.02 0.30 0.00 0.52 1.69 
Stress Total High 1.34 0.43 0.00 0.59 2.33 
MCS12 Indirect ATGS Medium -0.46 0.19 0.01 -0.97 -0.19 
MCS12 Indirect ATGS High -0.79 0.34 0.02 -1.64 -0.24 
MCS12 Total Medium -0.79 0.25 0.00 -1.41 -0.41 
MCS12 Total High -1.18 0.41 0.01 -2.13 -0.47 
PSOMS Indirect Optimism Low -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.09 -0.01 
PSOMS Indirect Optimism Medium -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 
PSOMS Indirect Optimism High -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.11 -0.03 
PSOMS Total Low -0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.02 
PSOMS Total Medium -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.13 -0.04 
PSOMS Total High -0.10 0.03 0.00 -0.18 -0.04 
 
Notes: S.E. = Standard errors; CI (L) = Bias-corrected confidence interval (Low); CI (H) = Bias-corrected 
confidence interval (High); MCS12=Mental Health; PCS12 = Physical Health; ATGS= Negative Attitudes Towards 
God; PSOMS= Positive States of Mind Scale.
 
  
Table 20. Effects of Beliefs on Well-Being, Moderated by Interpersonal Life Stressors 
 
Belief Outcome Type of Effect Mediator Level b Bootstrap S.E. P-value CI (L) CI (H) 
Retribution Anxiety Total Medium 0.24 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.51 
Retribution Stress Total Medium 0.36 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.72 
Retribution MCS12 Interaction -0.65 0.23 0.00 -1.10 -0.21 
Retribution PSOMS Indirect Optimism Medium -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.00 
Retribution PSOMS Total Medium -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 
Divine Responsibility Depression Indirect Optimism High -0.40 0.18 0.03 -0.84 -0.11 
Divine Responsibility Depression Total High -0.59 0.26 0.03 -1.18 -0.13 
Limited Knowledge Depression Total Medium 0.38 0.18 0.03 0.09 0.76 
Limited Knowledge Stress Total Medium 0.48 0.21 0.03 0.12 0.96 
Encounter Stress Direct 0.89 0.40 0.03 0.10 1.68 
Encounter MCS12 Interaction 0.53 0.24 0.03 0.05 1.01 
Encounter PSOMS Direct -0.09 0.03 0.01 -0.15 -0.02 
Providence Depression Indirect Optimism Low 0.27 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.59 
Providence Depression Total Low 0.47 0.19 0.01 0.18 0.92 
Providence Stress Total Low 0.50 0.21 0.02 0.12 0.95 
Providence MCS12 Indirect ATGS Low -0.29 0.13 0.03 -0.62 -0.08 
Providence MCS12 Total Low -0.50 0.18 0.01 -0.93 -0.19 
Providence MCS12 Total Medium -0.28 0.13 0.03 -0.60 -0.06 
Providence PSOMS Total Low -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.07 -0.01 
Suffering God Stress Indirect Optimism Medium -0.27 0.12 0.03 -0.55 -0.06 
Soul-Building PSOMS Direct -0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.13 -0.02 
Notes: S.E. = Standard errors; CI (L) = Bias-corrected confidence interval (Low); CI (H) = Bias-corrected confidence interval (High); MCS12=Mental Health; 
PCS12 = Physical Health; ATGS= Negative Attitudes Towards God; PSOMS= Positive States of Mind Scale. 
 
  
Figure 8.  Retribution & Interpersonal Stressors Predict Mental Health 
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Figure 9.  Encounter & Interpersonal Stressors Predict Mental Health 
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Table 21.  Time 2 Reports of stressful events  
 
Timing of Stressful Event % (N) 
Within the last month 31% (N=60) 
Within the last three months 29% (N=55) 
Within the last year and continued 14% (N=26) 
More than 1 but less than 3 years 8% (N=16) 
More than 3 years 6% (N=11) 
More than 5 years  12% (N=23) 
How stressful was it when it first occurred? 
Not at all 4% (N=7) 
A little bit 15% (N=30) 
Moderately 24% (N=48) 
Quite a bit 31% (N=60%) 
Extremely 26% (N=51) 
How stressful is it for you now? 
Not at all 20% (N=39) 
A little bit 21% (N=41) 
Moderately 25% (N=50) 
Quite a bit 23% (N=45) 
Extremely 11% (N=21) 
 
  
Running head: Religious Beliefs about Suffering
Figure 10.  Retribution & Current Appraisal Predicts Stress
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Running head: Religious Beliefs about Suffering
Figure 11.  Unorthodox & Current 
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Appraisal Predicts PSOMS 
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Running head: Religious Beliefs about Suffering
Figure 12.  Encounter & Current Appraisal Predicts PSOMS
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